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Articles
A Profession, If You Can Keep It:1
How Information Technology and Fading
Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace
and What We Should Do About It
Stephen Gillers*
Technology is changing the way we do business. It has made cross-border trade in goods
and services easy. Capital is finding ways to profit from the law business. Lawyers strive to
serve clients wherever they need help, including outside their jurisdiction of admission.
These changes not only affect how American law firms work, they challenge our system for
licensing and regulating lawyers. The traditional geocentric model for regulating the bar,
based on physical place of practice, is unstable today because lawyers can practice physically
in many places and (virtually) in every place, yet no place in particular.
The next twenty years are likely to see greater transformation in how the American (and
world) legal professions are organized and ply their services than was true for any
comparable period in history. We have two choices. We can try to impede these forces in
order to preserve a familiar and comfortable world that seems to be slipping away. Or we
can decide that today’s rules should adapt to accommodate and direct the forces at bay in
order to preserve the values of the American bar, which include the efficient delivery of
services at reasonable cost. This Article endorses the second goal and describes how we
might seek to achieve it.

* Elihu Root Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This Article benefits
immeasurably from my work on the American Bar Association’s Commission on Ethics 20/20, the
ideas of my colleagues there and the staff of the ABA’s Center for Professional Responsibility, and
the testimony of the witnesses before the Commission. I am grateful to ABA President Carolyn Lamm
for appointing me to the Commission in 2009 and to Jamie Gorelick and Michael Traynor for their
wise leadership of it. The Commission will begin to submit its recommendations to the ABA’s House
of Delegates for approval at the Association’s annual meeting in August 2012. I have benefitted from
discussing the ideas here with Barbara S. Gillers, who teaches legal ethics at NYU and Columbia Law
Schools. I also thank Carolyn F. Stoner, NYU J.D. Class of 2013, for her excellent research help. Last,
I am grateful to the D’Agostino/Greenberg Fund for assistance that allowed me to spend time on this
Article. Of course, I alone am responsible for the content of the Article.
1. James McHenry, a Maryland delegate to the Constitutional Convention, recorded the
following exchange with Benjamin Franklin at the close of the Convention: “A lady asked Dr.
Franklin, ‘Well Doctor what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?’ ‘A republic,’ replied the Doctor,
‘if you can keep it.’” Papers of Dr. James McHenry on the Federal Convention of 1787, 11 Am. Hist.
Rev. 595, 618 (1906); see Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations, Bartleby.com,
http://www.bartleby.com/73/1593.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). When McHenry’s notes were
included in 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 app. A, 85 (Max Farrand ed., 1911), a
footnote stated that the date this anecdote was written is uncertain.
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“It’s a new world, Golde.”
—Tevye, Fiddler on the Roof

Introduction: The End of Lawyers (or Something)?
To quote Mark Twain on hearing news of his death, recent titles
announcing the “End of Lawyers,” or the “Death of Big Law,” or the
2
“Vanishing of the American Lawyer” may be “grossly exaggerated.”
3
I do not begrudge the authors of these works for using metaphors of

2. In 1897, Twain was living in London where a cousin, Dr. Jim Clemens, fell ill. The
newspapers, believing Twain was near death, sent reporters to investigate. Twain made his remark
when the correspondent for the Evening Sun told him that his death had been reported in New York,
and asked what he should cable in reply. Mark Twain, Mark Twain in Eruption: Hitherto
Unpublished Pages About Men and Events 252–53 (Bernard De Voto ed., 3d ed. 1940). According
to one source, he said: “Just say the report of my death has been grossly exaggerated.” 2 Albert
Bigelow Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography 1039 (1st ed. 1912).
3. The works implicitly referenced here are: Thomas D. Morgan, The Vanishing American
Lawyer (2010); Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal
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demise to describe the state of the legal profession. Provocative titles
attract curious readers. They are especially helpful on a subject as
unexciting outside the profession as is this one. And they are only titles
after all, not analysis. What’s more, they only exaggerate. The symptoms
tell us that even if the patient is not comatose, it’s running a high fever—
walking pneumonia, perhaps.
It is nothing new that the American bar changes from one
generation to the next, even within generations. Lawyers in 1910 would
be surprised by the world of American law practice circa 1950,
astonished if a time machine landed them in 1980, and aghast at the
profession of 2012. Law students graduating from American law schools
today will, I predict, see greater upheaval in how the bar is regulated and
who may profit from the law industry than any generation before them. I
speak not of the content or processes of the law—though I might—but of
the nature of practice, how lawyers are organized, and the product
delivered and therefore the inevitable changes to regulation. But change
is constant. What else is new?
Much is new, I think, even if it will not work the upheavals that
these works predict. Developments external to law practice and the
insular world of lawyer regulation will change the way we practice and
will marginalize the effectiveness of regulation unless that also changes.
4
“Disruptive” is a helpful word to describe these external developments.
I do not think the disruptive externalities portend anything like the death
or end of law, but instead, only a need for reformulation (with the accent
on “reform”). We err if we forget how adaptable the bar is in fashioning
new strategies to sell its product and how imaginative it can be when the
market and other forces create a need for its knowledge, often
anticipating (if not creating) needs long before clients reach for the
5
phone. I am not worried about the profession, which will not die, recede,
or seriously weaken. It will just reorganize, find new products, find new
ways to deliver old products, and locate new clients. It is already doing
these things. My purpose is to examine how professional regulation must
adjust to the disruptive externalities; that is, how it must adjust or slide
toward irrelevance.
Courts are the dominant institutional regulator of the bar,
6
supplemented (when judges allow) by legislation and agency rules.

Services (2008); and Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 3.
4. I borrow the phrase “disruptive externalities” from Susskind’s phrase “disruptive
technologies,” technologies being one of the externalities addressed here. See Susskind, supra note 3,
at 99–100.
5. Consider the creation of the trust, which divides legal and beneficial ownership of property.
See, e.g., Kent Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 UMKC L. Rev. 181,
181–83 (2009).
6. Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 8–10 (9th ed. 2012).
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Behind the courts are lawyers, who are, depending on the jurisdiction,
more or less influential in the rulemaking process, but overall, more
7
rather than less influential. Then, once a rule is debated and adopted, all
that is left is enforcement. Those with power have decided the issue and
that is the end of that.
This is true in a formal sense, but false otherwise. Even a rule that
may appear wise at adoption can become unrealistic, inefficient, or
8
toothless as the world changes but the rule does not. And some rules are
not wise on adoption but are, rather, comfort rules, or often not rules at
all but suggestions. They have nostalgic appeal, invoking an image of
how we believe the bar should be, how in our memories or mythology it
9
once was, and how in our aspirations it should remain. What is
happening now is that forces outside the institutions of rulemaking and
the objectives of the rulemakers are changing (or promising to change)
the way lawyers behave. The changes in behavior may make a lot of
10
sense, which is why they are happening. But the rules do not always
change to accommodate the new behavior. Partly this is a phenomenon
common to much rulemaking. The world changes, the rules and law play
catch up. If a rule lags too far behind, it becomes ceremonial. We wheel
it out to punish the unfortunate transgressor whom we manage to catch,
unaware of the hundreds or thousands of others doing the same. The
rules will change, I have no doubt of that—but slowly. I am not writing
11
for next month or next year. I hope I am doing what academics, with no
constituents to please except perhaps each other, should do: that is, to
imagine reforms before it is politically feasible to adopt them.
Much has been written about the constitutionality of rules
12
regulating who may practice law and where. Some of the harsher
exclusionary rules have been struck down under one or another
constitutional provision. These have concerned the clash between state
13
unauthorized practice rules and federal law, rules excluding out-of-state

7. Id. at 9–10.
8. Consider, for example, the rule on fee splitting, which went through several iterations from
restrictive to liberal, eventually coming to reflect what lawyers were doing anyway. Id. at 208–09.
9. So-called “aspirational rules” are in this category. The Ethical Considerations in the ABA’s
Model Code of Professional Responsibility are one example: “The Ethical Considerations are
aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive.” Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1980).
Aspirational rules encourage a level of conduct but do not purport to bind anyone.
10. Cross-border practice may be the most dramatic example. See infra text accompanying notes
16–31.
11. And needless perhaps to add, since my prescriptions are for the long haul, nothing I say is
meant to suggest that whatever slower pace the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 or the ABA House
of Delegates now elects therefore falls short.
12. See, e.g., Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of
Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 135 (2004).
13. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 400–01 (1963) (holding that state
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residents from a jurisdiction’s bar, and rules allowing a state’s residents
15
to gain easier bar admission than could out-of-state residents. Perhaps
we have reached the end of the line, at least for the immediate term, for
whatever the Constitution has to say on the topic. Perhaps not. My focus,
however, is policy, not law. What makes sense for the new world
described here? How can we best move willingly from the nineteenthcentury ideology of regulation to the twenty-first century’s reality of
practice while embracing the American bar’s traditional values?

I. An Illusion of Control Is Not Good
in Lawyer Regulation
There could hardly be a better example of the disjuncture between
rule and behavior than what has come to be known as multijurisdictional
practice, which is another way of saying that in working for clients
lawyers travel outside the jurisdiction that licenses them. Looked at one
way, as courts sometimes have, traveling lawyers are not lawyers when
16
they cross a state or a national border. Every so often, a lawyer would
get into a dispute with a client, who would then refuse to pay the lawyer,
claiming that the lawyer was practicing law where she was not authorized
to do so. (“Where” is a key word, as we shall see.) This was a rare
17
occurrence, but when it happened, a court might agree with the client.
18
The quality of the lawyer’s work was irrelevant. The courts purported to
19
enforce a public policy in denying a fee. The client’s knowledge of the
power to regulate the bar was subordinate under the Supremacy Clause to federal law allowing lay
representation in the U.S. patent office); Nat’l Revenue Corp. v. Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 290 (1st Cir.
1986) (concluding that state law limiting debt collection to licensed lawyers violated the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution).
14. Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288–89 (1984) (ruling that New Hampshire could not
prevent a Vermont citizen from gaining admission to its bar after taking its state bar examination); see
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973) (holding that Connecticut could not limit bar admission to U.S.
citizens).
15. Supreme Court v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 59 (1988) (ruling that the state could not limit
admission by motion to state residents).
16. See, e.g., In re Jackman, 761 A.2d 1103, 1103–04 (N.J. 2000) (delaying consideration of
admission to the New Jersey bar of a Massachusetts lawyer who practiced law for seven years in New
Jersey without authorization).
17. See, e.g., Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161, 166 (N.D. 1986) (holding that a Minnesota
lawyer could not recover fees for federal tax advice given to a North Dakota client while the lawyer
was in North Dakota, but could recover fees for such advice given while the lawyer was in Minnesota).
The lawyer in Ranta had a more extensive North Dakota practice than the single client whose work
was the subject of the case. The court cited his “long-term unauthorized practice in this State, his
involvement with many other area clients, and his opening a branch office in Bismarck.” Id. at 165.
However, the court’s holding did not rest on this factor.
18. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1998).
In this case, the client had sued for malpractice and the law firm counterclaimed for its fee. Without
deciding the malpractice claim, the court denied the fee for work performed by New York lawyers
“in” California. See infra text accompanying notes 22–24.
19. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 11.
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lawyer’s jurisdictional limitations was also irrelevant because clients
20
could not consent to a violation of public policy. Despite these rare
decisions, there is no evidence that lawyers stopped getting in planes,
trains, and cars to cross state and national borders. One time in a million
(or in a very large number) a lawyer might get caught and lose all or part
21
of her fee. We have lived with the discrepancy between the way people
actually behaved—because it made sense to behave that way and because
it was efficient, beneficial, and respected the autonomy of lawyers and
clients—and the occasional victim of ambiguous unauthorized practice
rules. Odds were high that you would not be one of those victims.
And then came a victim whose plight garnered broad attention and
galvanized the bar to update its rules. In Birbrower, Montalbano,
Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
denied a New York law firm any fee for work its lawyers did for a
California company on an impending California arbitration (which never
occurred) when the work was performed physically in California (the
lawyers traveled there three times for a few days each time) and when
the work was done physically in New York but “virtually” in California
22
by email, fax, or phone. The court described the lawyer’s work “in”
California as “extensive,” citing the trips, the fact that the client was a
California company, and the fact that the arbitration would occur in the
23
state under California law. (“In” is also a key word in the world of
unauthorized practice.) The court did not say whether any single factor
was decisive or identify their relative weights, making planning nearly
impossible. But the court also said that the very same work, even the
lawyers’ advice on California law, could be compensated if done while
the lawyers were physically in New York and not “virtually” in
24
California.
The Birbrower decision, by focusing on the physical or virtual
location of the lawyers, was so misguided, and so unclear in explaining
when the nexus with California was great enough for the work to be
deemed “in” California and therefore the unauthorized practice of law,
that it had to be quickly undone. Lawyers were spurred into action
because here was a living casualty of a dated idea and even more so
because other lawyers could easily see themselves in the same
predicament. The California Supreme Court had elsewhere been
20. Id.
21. Indeed, it is in fee disputes that the rule is mainly enforced. Absent egregious behavior,
disciplinary authorities have not been much interested in fencing out transient lawyers. For examples
of egregious cases, see Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The
Art of Making Change, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 685, 683–85 (2002).
22. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 2–4. I analyzed this opinion and the reaction to it in Gillers, supra note 21.
23. In addition, the lawyer’s fee agreement with the client was governed by California law.
Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 2.
24. Id. at 5–6.
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25

enlightened about modern practice —and if it could happen there, it
could happen anywhere.
In the ensuing years, even California courts read Birbrower narrowly,
26
as did other courts. Some courts declined to extend it or rejected it. The
Ninth Circuit used the phrase “judicial Luddites” in rejecting the
27
Birbrower understanding of “modern law practice.” Prodded by the
legislature, a California Supreme Court committee set about rewriting
the rules on cross-border practice to recognize what had been true for
decades—what lawyers assumed the rules already allowed and what no
rule was going to stop because cross-border work reflected the judgments
28
of reasonable clients and lawyers about what was in their interest to do.
29
So the state’s rules were forced to catch up. The ABA did the same with
30
its rules. Without Birbrower, we might still be living with the wide gulf

25. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal Rptr. 2d 1, 3–4 (Ct. App. 1994)
(recognizing an employed lawyer’s right to sue a corporate client for retaliatory discharge).
26. Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing
the economic realities of modern law practice); Estate of Condon, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 927–29 (Ct.
App. 1998) (declining to extend Birbrower, the court wrote, “In the real world of 1998 we do not live
or do business in isolation within strict geopolitical boundaries. Social interaction and the conduct of
business transcends state and national boundaries; it is truly global.”).
27. The Winterrowd court explained:
Even at a time when the largest law firms in the United States were composed of not
many more than one hundred lawyers, Judge Friendly observed that we live in an “age of
increased specialization and high mobility of the bar.” Spanos v. Skouras, 364 F.2d 161, 170
(2d Cir. 1966). But in 1966, there were no personal computers, no Internet, no Blackberries,
no teleconferencing, no emails, and the only person who had a two-way wrist radio was
cartoon character Dick Tracy. Today, largely because of the benefits of modern technology,
hundreds of U.S.-based law firms are composed of many hundreds, or even thousands, of
lawyers and support personnel contemporaneously doing business in many states and
throughout the world. Lawyers throughout the United States regularly participate in
teleconferences and group email sessions with other lawyers in other states, and lawyers and
paralegals from one or more firms participate in massive discovery projects arising out of a
single case concerning papers and data located in several states. In many such instances,
only a small fraction of the lawyers involved in a case are members of the bar of the state
where the presiding court sits. Current law does not compel us to be judicial Luddites, and
we may properly accommodate many of the realities of modern law practice, while still
securing to federal courts the ability to control and discipline those who practice before
them.
556 F.3d at 819–20. Another holding of Birbrower—that an appearance in arbitration is the practice of
law within the meaning of the unauthorized practice rules— also has been rejected. See infra text
accompanying notes 125–130.
28. ABA, Report of the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice 2–3 (2002), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/intro_cover.authcheckdam.pdf.
29. Cal. R. Ct. 9.43–9.48.
30. The ABA amended its Model Rules of Professional Conduct to create “safe harbors” for
cross-border practice in Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5 (2011). As of 2011, forty-five U.S.
jurisdictions have adopted this rule in substantially similar or identical form. ABA, State
Implementation of ABA Model Rule 5.5 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/quick_guide_5_5.authcheckdam.pdf.
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31

between rule and reality.
The old rules depended on the illusion (even self-deception) that
rules rule, full stop. They operated from the complacent assumption that
behavior will conform to rules. The new California and ABA rules were
adopted to conform rules to behavior. The lesson from this experience is
that lawyers in their bar groups and judges in their chambers cannot
write rules that stray far from the rational choices of lawyers and clients
and expect obedience to what they demand.
There is a lesson behind this lesson, which will be the main theme of
this Article. Once upon a time, lawyers worked at a desk. The desk was
in a place (a state) and the government of that state (via the courts
granting a license) validated the lawyer’s presence at that desk in that
state. Without validation there was no lawyer and no desk. The license
stopped at the border of the state. Geography as an organizing principle
for regulation worked well enough until the final quarter of the twentieth
century. Its benefits were apparent: If lawyers stayed put, if their clients
came from the state that licensed them, if their firms had one office, if
physical travel to other places was the exception, and virtual travel
limited to telephone and telex, then defining the license by the
geographical boundary of the state that granted it made sense; or at least
it didn’t create inconvenience and widespread disobedience. The
licensing regime was not driven by a wish to keep other lawyers out
because those lawyers worked at their own desks in their own states and
also stayed put. In a sense, each jurisdiction was a cocoon. The salutary
purpose of licensing was (and still is) to ensure the competence and
integrity of home-state lawyers. However, even in this simpler time, some
states erected formidable barriers to discourage lawyers from relocating.
Among those barriers were durational residency requirements. These
baldly anticompetitive rules, which prevented a relocating lawyer from
gaining admission to a state’s bar, whether on motion or by examination,
until she had resided in the state for a set period of time, were eventually
32
struck down.
31. New York still lives with that gulf. As I know from my service on it, the commission that
proposed the amendments to the Model Rules to allow cross-border practice worried that small states,
especially small states near big cities (like New Hampshire and New Jersey), would reject the rules for
fear that big-state lawyers would cherry pick the best matters that would otherwise go to lawyers in the
small states. Presumptively, predatory New York lawyers were prominent in this worry. As it turns
out, New York rejected the new rules. One participant in the meeting with the New York judges who
made this decision told me that one judge who opposed the rules asked rhetorically how he could
defend letting a lawyer from Vermont take business from a lawyer in New York.
32. See, e.g., Keenan v. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1351 (D.C.N.C. 1970) (holding
that one-year residence requirement to take the state bar violates the constitutional right to travel). A
modern vestige of such barriers is the requirement that lawyers from one jurisdiction, no matter how
experienced, take the bar examination in a jurisdiction to which they relocate. Thirteen American
states impose this requirement. Others permit motion admission. See Nat’l Conference of Bar
Examiners & ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Comprehensive Guide to Bar
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Geography, or place, remains the governing principle as a formal
matter—it still animates many of the rules regulating lawyers—but at the
expense of a widening gap between those rules and the conduct of the
bar. Three forces have undermined the idea of a licensing authority
coterminous with a jurisdiction’s physical border. First, technology does
not recognize borders. Second, physical travel is easy if not always
pleasant. Third, clients’ needs increasingly cross borders as they also take
advantage of technology and easier travel. These changes, which will
only become more prominent, mean that we require a new (or
additional) governing principle beyond geography.
We should not have needed Birbrower to spur us to revise our rules
on cross-border practice. The inadequacy of physical place as an
organizing principle was long apparent. We should have seen that the
conduct the old California rules were held to prohibit (and that similar
rules elsewhere could then have been held to prohibit) did not pose a
risk to the public or clients that justified the state’s closed door policy
and its impediment to rational economic activity. We should have revised
those misguided rules earlier, as we partly did thereafter, to sensibly
reconcile the competing interests, which is the purpose of regulation in
the first place. We should do the same today for other rules to take
account of expanding technology and the cross-border needs of clients,
while preserving the good things that regulation offers. What exactly are
those good things? We need to know in order to identify what we do
next.

II. What Do We Get for All of Our Lawyer Regulation?
Dense and detailed though the world of lawyer regulation is, the
rules fall into two neat categories: Rules that determine who can be a
lawyer and rules that determine how lawyers may, must, or must not
behave.
A. Who Can Be a Lawyer?
There are three rules in this category: One rule specifies an
33
a second describes an examination
educational requirement,
34
35
requirement, and a third has a character requirement. A person who
wants to practice law in a place must satisfy all three rules unless
36
excused. What constitutes the practice of law, as opposed to the practice
Admission Requirements 2011, at 35 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/legaled/publications/20110201_Comp_Guide.authcheckdam.pdf.
33. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, §§ 520.3–520.6 (2011).
34. Id. §§ 520.8–520.9.
35. Id. § 520.12.
36. Many states also have rules allowing lawyers to gain admission to the bar on motion, without
taking an examination, if the lawyers have practiced for a defined period of time. See, e.g., id. § 520.10.
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of something else that may resemble law or that a person who is not a
lawyer may do along with lawyers, is a different debate. Efforts have
37
been made to define the practice of law. They have not been satisfying.
1. Education
In American history there was a time that no education, at least no
38
formal education, was required for law practice. One could hang out a
shingle, possibly after a law office apprenticeship. That remains true in
39
some jurisdictions. In reality, however, new lawyers will have gone to
law school for three years, after four years of college, and for most
jurisdictions that law school will be approved by the American Bar
40
Association. Today, the rules of most courts require graduation from an
41
ABA-approved law school, though with exceptions.
What does this requirement get us? It ensures that new lawyers have
reached an age of presumptive maturity because they will have had seven
years of postsecondary education. More important, it means that new
lawyers will have had a rigorous and demanding intellectual experience—
a benefit of the ABA’s Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of

37. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.101 (West 2011), which provides in part:
(a) In this chapter the “practice of law” means the preparation of a pleading or other
document incident to an action or special proceeding or the management of the action or
proceeding on behalf of a client before a judge in court as well as a service rendered out of
court, including the giving of advice or the rendering of any service requiring the use of legal
skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract, or other instrument, the legal effect of
which under the facts and conclusions involved must be carefully determined.
(b) The definition in this section is not exclusive and does not deprive the judicial branch of
the power and authority under both this chapter and the adjudicated cases to determine
whether other services and acts not enumerated may constitute the practice of law.
38. Perlman, supra note 12, at 145.
39. California, for example, permits a person to qualify to take the bar through study in a judge’s
chambers or a law office for four years. Cal. State Bar R. 4.26 provides:
General applicants for the California Bar Examination must
(A) have received a juris doctor (J.D.) or bachelor of laws (LL.B) degree from a law school
approved by the American Bar Association or accredited by the Committee; or
(B) demonstrate that in accordance with these rules and the requirements of Business &
Professions Code §6060(e)(2) they have
(1) studied law diligently and in good faith for at least four years in a law school
registered with the Committee; in a law office; in a judge’s chambers; or by some
combination of these methods; or
(2) met the requirements of these rules for legal education in a foreign state or country; and
(C) have passed or established exemption from the First-Year Law Students’ Examination.
40. See the detailed information collected by the ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar at Legal Education Statistics from ABA-Approved Law Schools, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
41. A few jurisdictions, including California and Massachusetts, permit graduates of law schools
that are not approved by the ABA to take their bar examinations. See, e.g., Cal. State Bar R. 4.27;
Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct. R. 3:01, § 3.1.3.
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Law Schools —focused on legal rules and legal reasoning. They will
have learned the particular way that lawyers think. But beyond styles of
thought, they also will have learned the law: the basic law taught in
43
required courses and the law of any other subjects they may elect to
44
take, among which will often be courses that once were required.
2. The Bar Examination
The bar examination is meant to complement the educational
requirement. We can question its purpose. At one time, and still to some
extent, it tested the applicant’s knowledge of the law of the particular
45
place from which she wished to get a license to practice law. The
examination requirement necessarily implies that a state cannot
confidently defer to the fact of graduation from a law school, even an
ABA-approved law school, to conclude that all applicants have the
46
intellect and knowledge required for law practice in the jurisdiction.

42. ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, 2011–2012 Standards and Rules
of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools (2012) [hereinafter ABA Standards].
43. While the identity of the required courses will vary by school, the core curriculum remains
generally unchanged: contracts, torts, property, criminal law, constitutional law, and civil procedure.
The ABA’s Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools are modest in their
description of the required content of a legal education. Standard 302(a), id. at 20, states the content
requirement:
(a) A law school shall require that each student receive substantial instruction in:
(1) the substantive law generally regarded as necessary to effective and responsible
participation in the legal profession;
(2) legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem solving, and oral communication;
(3) writing in a legal context, including at least one rigorous writing experience in the first
year and at least one additional rigorous writing experience after the first year;
(4) other professional skills generally regarded as necessary for effective and responsible
participation in the legal profession; and
(5) the history, goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal profession and
its members.
44. For example, although corporations and evidence are not required classes, in my law school, a
large majority of students take each.
45. For example, the first day of the Missouri bar examination consists of a combination of the
Multistate Essay Examination prepared by the National Conference of Bar Examiners and essay
questions prepared by the Missouri Board of Law Examiners. Rule 8.08 of the Rules Governing
Admission to the Bar in Missouri provides:
The essay questions may cover all or some of the following subject matters: agency and
partnership, corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs), conflicts of law, estates,
family law, federal civil procedure, trusts and future interests, sales, commercial paper,
secured transactions, constitutional law, contracts, criminal law and procedure, evidence,
real property, torts, administrative law, remedies, and Missouri civil procedure.
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 8.08. All essay questions must be answered according to Missouri law. Id.
46. This is an inescapable inference from the fact that states require both graduation from law
school and bar examination passage. See, e.g., Fla. Bar R. 1.15.1 (“The primary purpose of the bar
examination is to ensure that all who are admitted to The Florida Bar have demonstrated minimum
technical competence.”). Florida also requires graduation from an ABA-approved law school. Fla.
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The number of graduates the examination excludes, even after multiple
47
tries, is comparatively small. We might also question whether how one
performs on a multiday examination under significant pressure predicts
how she will perform in the rather different milieu of law practice. We
might assume that success in a law school—at least measured by the fact
of graduation—is a better predictor. Or if not, if a state fears that law
schools might set the graduation bar too low, a higher measure of law
school success (a certain grade point average, for example) might be used
to obviate further testing for those who meet it. Perhaps this would not
work, however, because standards may vary across schools, which might
actually then compete to graduate the greatest number of students
exempt from the examination and thereby raise the yield for the entering
classes.
The second assumption behind the bar examination is that it is
necessary to test the applicant’s knowledge of the law of the jurisdiction
48
from which she seeks a license. Applicants go to law school nationwide
but seek a law license in a particular place. That place may wish to assure
itself, before it allows the applicant to have local clients, that she knows
the law of the place. This can lead to minute questions about the law of
the place, such as: the number of witnesses required for a will and who
they must not be; the grounds for divorce and annulment; the scope of
the statement against interest hearsay exception; the exceptions to the
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality; when the statute of limitations is tolled
in a medical malpractice case; whether a deed has to be acknowledged
and how; and the difference between first and second degree
49
manslaughter. Put aside the fact that the answers to all such questions
can be found quickly when the need for them arises. Put aside the fact
that these questions test the applicant’s memory, which will be quickly
Board of Bar Examiners, http://www.floridabarexam.org/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
47. Nationwide, in 2010 eighty-one percent of graduates of ABA-approved schools passed the bar
examination the first time and forty-one percent of repeaters passed. 2010 First-Time Exam Takers
and Repeaters from ABA-Approved Law Schools, Bar Examiner, Mar. 2011, at 19.
48. This is apparent in the Missouri rule specifying that essay questions on the Missouri bar
examination, even those on the Multistate Essay Examination, must be answered under Missouri law.
See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 8.08. Missouri was the first state to adopt the uniform bar examination, but that
adoption will not prevent it from testing on state law. Other states that have adopted the Multistate
Essay Examination do not use it to test state law but rather use the “general principles” in the model
answers developed by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, the creator of the Multistate Essay
Examination. These jurisdictions may also test local law in separate essays. See, e.g., Ala. Bar. R. VI.
49. These questions are all hypothetical, but they describe the kind of microlocal law inquiry a
test taker might expect to encounter. For example, the California State Bar website identifies the
following subjects on which applicants should prepare to be tested: the effect of the death of a married
person on their community and quasi-community property; the provisions of the probate code dealing
with simultaneous death; and “[t]hose provisions of Article 9 concerning Fixtures.” Scope of the
California Bar Examination: General Bar Examination and Attorneys’ Examination, State Bar of
Cal. Comm. of Bar Examiners/Office of Admissions, http://admissions.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=VQF73Jr-8iE%3d&tabid=245 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
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emptied when the test is over. Put aside the fact that lawyers then in
practice in the testing state will rarely know the answers to these
questions without research, unless they concentrate in the particular area
of law. And put aside the fact that many applicants may never again need
to know the answers to most or all of these questions because they will
practice, for example, antitrust law or intellectual property law.
The necessary premise behind testing local law knowledge is that
the local law is sufficiently different from the law elsewhere such that an
examination is needed to ensure that the applicant knows it, if only for
the days of the examination. For if the law of the place is not so different
(and if memory for small bits of information is a questionable indicator
of competence to practice law), then the justification for the bar
examination is a generic one—that is, to test the applicant’s legal
reasoning, her ability to interpret rules and to apply them to particular
facts, and her knowledge of the constitutional limitations on government
power.
While an applicant should be expected to know that there is a
difference between manslaughter and murder and the nature of that
difference, it should give us no assurance of competence that the
applicant has managed, with the benefit of an intense, two month, factstuffing bar preparation class, to remember the precise elements of
second degree manslaughter in the testing jurisdiction. The advent of
51
multistate bar examinations that are not state law specific, and the
52
incipient interest in a single uniform bar examination, may reflect
increasing state recognition that testing temporary memory of the
minutiae of local law is not a useful predictor of competence. Or it may
50. A California lawyer told me that her bar review class helped students recall all state felonies
with an acronym, each letter of which identified a different felony. Now, thirty years later, she still
recalled part of it, Mr. and Mrs. Lamb, though not what each letter signified.
51. The various multistate examinations and the state adoptions can be found at the website for
the National Conference of Bar Examiners. See Multistate Tests, Nat’l Conference of Bar
Examiners, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests (last visited Mar. 17, 2012); NCBE Testing Services,
Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/
Multistate-Tests/2011NCBETesting-Services-including-UBE-jurisdictions122711.pdf.
52. The ABA reported on January 28, 2010:
A recent resurgence of interest in a potential national uniform bar exam has sparked debate
in the legal community among practitioners, jurists, law students, and bar examiners.
As many as 32 states are reportedly considering changing their existing exam requirements
to a uniform national examination.
Tiffany M. Williams, Examining the Feasibility of a National Uniform Bar Exam, ABA Litig. News
(Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/national-bar-exam.html.
A uniform bar examination would not necessarily eliminate testing in local law. A state would be
free to supplement its examination with a local law test. See Essays on a Uniform Bar Examination,
Bar Examiner, Feb. 2009, at 6 (discussing this question). The Bar Examiner is published by the
National Conference of Bar Examiners, which has developed the uniform bar examination. See The
Uniform Bar Examination, Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners, http://www.ncbex.org/multistatetests/ube/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
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instead (or also) reflect a preference for the administrative convenience
and financial savings of assigning the development and scoring of bar
examinations to an outside organization.
Claims that the bar examination is required to ensure that a law
school has done its job to the state’s satisfaction and that the applicant
knows the law of the place from which she seeks a license are challenged
by the way many states treat relocating lawyers. A lawyer who has
practiced in one place may wish to move to another. A salutary rule in
many places permits motion admission, which will grant a license without
the need to take the jurisdiction’s bar examination if the applicant has
53
practiced law elsewhere for a designated number of years. But in some
states even seasoned lawyers must take the bar examination (or an
54
abbreviated version of it) alongside new graduates. That includes
lawyers who have successfully practiced elsewhere, who have letters
commending their legal skill, and who work in an area of federal law and
have little interest in the law of the place to which they move. A
suspicious person might wonder whether the examination requirement is
intended to dissuade entry, just as durational residency requirements
55
once did. The examination is not here needed to ensure that the
applicant’s law school did not graduate a dud. Differences in the law of
the new place from the law of the old place can be the only defensible
justification for the requirement and that justification dissolves if the law
is not (so) different, if the differences are irrelevant to the migrating
lawyer’s practice, if the state does not test local law on its examination, or
if the differences can be quickly ascertained. (“I practice securities law.
Why do I have to memorize the elements of assault? And if I ever do
need to know them, I’ll open a book.”).
3. Character Committees
The final hurdle to bar admission is the character committee. These
committees have a troubling history. At one time, they excluded
applicants for reasons having nothing to do with what can reasonably be
called character, let alone a rational prediction of an applicant’s behavior
56
if admitted. Bias probably explains some decisions. Committees also
57
excluded applicants who were in intimate relationships but not married.

53. For states with such rules and the variations among them, see ABA, Admission by Motion
Rules (Dec. 9, 2009).
54. According to the ABA, eleven states do not recognize admission on motion for lawyers who
have been admitted to practice in another U.S. jurisdiction. Id.
55. See supra text accompanying note 32.
56. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern
America 94–101 (1976).
57. Cord v. Gibb, 254 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Va. 1979) (rejecting the lower court’s decision to deny
admission to the bar to a woman living with a man to whom she was not married).
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58

They excluded gay men and lesbians. They assumed the power to
exclude applicants based on disloyalty to the U.S. and state
59
60
constitutions, or based on personality disorders. Sometimes these
61
disorders were associated with particular ethnic or religious groups.
Today, character committees might better be called conduct
committees. What they try to determine is whether conduct in the life of
the applicant predicts that she will act dishonorably as a lawyer: that is,
will break the rules that govern law practice and thereby harm clients
and the justice system. Committees have been criticized even when their
62
investigations are so limited. Are these predictions reliable? Are they
reliable enough to justify exclusion or delay in admission? What can we
say about future behavior from the fact that an applicant shoplifted a
sweater while in college, or shared a controlled substance with friends, or
failed to pay a dozen parking tickets, or cheated on a metaphysics exam,
or even a law school evidence exam, and got an F? On the other hand, if
the conduct is disreputable enough, if it reveals disregard of the law or
breach of trust for self-advantage, who should bear the risk that the
prediction will be wrong? A strong argument can be made that the state
should not be required to give a seal of approval to an applicant who, for
example, has betrayed others or who broke the law for personal gain,
and who if admitted will hang the state’s license on her office wall to
induce trust from clients.
The new world I will describe, with its disruptive externalities,
envisions a role for character committees, the same circumscribed role as
today. Whatever the justification for these committees—and I think they
are justified if their focus is narrow—the disruptive externalities do not
displace them. Indeed, a state to which a practicing lawyer relocates has a
heightened claim to a character (or conduct) inquiry because the lawyer
admitted elsewhere will have had more time to misbehave, including in
practice, compared to the new graduate. A jurisdiction may wish to
weigh the fact that a relocating lawyer has been disciplined or found

58. State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825, 825 (Fla. 1957).
59. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 156–57 (1971).
An applicant to the New York bar was required to “take an oath that he will support the Constitutions
of the United States and of the State of New York.” Id. at 157. Although the plaintiffs could cite no
case in which “any applicant has ever been unjustifiably denied permission to practice law” under this
requirement, they claimed that “New York’s system by its very existence works a ‘chilling effect’ upon
the free exercise of the rights of speech and association of students who must anticipate having to meet
its requirements.” Id. at 158–59.
60. See generally Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995) (canvassing
the history of these inquiries).
61. Auerbach, supra note 56, at 99–101.
62. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale L.J.
491 (1985).
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civilly liable for a breach of fiduciary duty even if the underlying conduct
has not led to the loss or even suspension of her license.
B. The Rules Governing Lawyers
So far, I have identified rules that control entry into a jurisdiction’s
legal profession. Separate and exponentially more complicated sources
govern the conduct of the admitted lawyer. These include cases that
define legal malpractice and breach of duty as a fiduciary (which a lawyer
63
is ), ethical or professional conduct rules under various names, and
legislation and case law that control how law is practiced. These rules fall
into two categories, one of which most concerns me. The first category
describes the lawyer’s relationship to specific others: their clients and
former clients, courts and other tribunals, opposing lawyers and clients,
64
other third persons, and (modestly) the jurisdiction’s justice system. The
rules in the second category, the focus here, address how the law
marketplace is organized and how it sells its product. They answer such
questions as who may trade in legal services in the jurisdiction; what the
65
word “in” means in an age of virtual communication; when law practice
66
67
is unauthorized; how a law office may and may not be organized; and
68
who may profit from, own, and manage a law firm. In short, these rules
define the legal marketplace by tightly controlling the organization and
operation of the supply side—the producers of the service and who may
earn money from it.
The rules in this second category, like those in the first, are justified
by the need to ensure competence and honesty. To some extent they do
so, although often less directly, by purporting to diminish the risk of
improper influence from lay interests and the risk of error by persons not
trained in the law of the jurisdiction. They may do these things by
closing, so far as possible, a jurisdiction’s law business to lawyers from
outside the jurisdiction’s borders and to nonlawyers from anywhere. The
closure is not airtight, but serious enough to create impediments to cross63. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994).
64. In this category are, for example, rules on confidentiality, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.6 (2010); rules on conflicts of interest, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7–.12
(2010); and rules on duty to tribunals, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1-.4 (2010).
65. The word “in” challenged the Birbrower court, which recognized that its holding would
depend directly on the elasticity of that preposition. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v.
Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Cal. 1998).
66. See, e.g., Prof’l Adjustors, Inc. v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. 1982) (invalidating a
legislative scheme that created licensed insurance adjustors because the work they were authorized to
do for individuals with claims against insurance carriers entailed interpretation of contracts and
negotiation deemed the practice of law).
67. Law firms may be partnerships, limited liability partnerships, or professional corporations.
See, e.g., Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers § 9 cmt. b (2000).
68. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2010), in force in every jurisdiction but Washington,
D.C. forbids nonlawyers from having an ownership interest in or managing a law firm.
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border practice and nonlawyer competition. Failure to evaluate whether
these barriers are needed, whether they should be as high as they are,
and whether their goals may be achieved without the same level of
exclusion invites benign civil disobedience—that is, lawyers, firms,
clients, and others behave in ways that they reasonably see as efficient
and rational even if (sometimes vaguely) forbidden. As in Birbrower, one
lawyer in ten thousand may be unlucky enough to face sanction for
transgressing these rules, but as in Birbrower, that will not stop much of
the behavior. People act according to what they assume sensible rules
should allow and therefore (they assume) do allow. In good faith, they
may conclude incorrectly that their conduct is permitted. The Birbrower
lawyers likely believed that they were operating on the safe side of any
unauthorized practice line. That there was even an issue may never have
occurred to them. I believe that most American lawyers would have
agreed that the conduct was proper and certainly did not constitute the
“extensive” practice of law “in” California, including virtually from New
69
York. That widespread agreement is what made the decision so
70
shocking and set in motion an effort to upend it.
Of course, the rules in this second category have long created
barriers to out-of-state lawyers, but they were not so inconvenient until
recently. What has changed is the perception that today, because of
technology and client needs indifferent to borders, the second category’s
rules dramatically impede the efficient delivery of legal services by
71
lawyers without a countervailing benefit. The disruptive and extralegal
externalities described in Part IV below encourage that perception. (By
“extralegal” I mean only that they are external to the rulemaking
universe, not that they are unlawful.) Separately, the second category’s
rules also impede—indeed categorically forbid—participation in the
ownership or management of law firms by persons who are not lawyers
72
anywhere —in other words, nonlawyers, which is the name lawyers give

69. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 7.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 24–31.
71. See, e.g., Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2009).
72. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2010). Only Washington, D.C. has exceptions to
this exclusion. D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4(b) (2007) provides:
A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a
financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer
who performs professional services which assist the organization in providing legal services
to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest undertake
to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the partnership or
organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent
as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
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to the rest of the world. And this exclusion also affects the market for
legal advice and therefore its cost. But here, too, disruptive externalities
are challenging these exclusionary rules or, in any event, are making
them much harder to enforce.
While I appreciate the value of “end is near” tropes in book titles, I
do not join the chorus nor characterize as terminal the effect on the legal
profession of technology and the growth in cross-border commerce. My
purpose is different. We do not need to define the level of threat to
recognize that there are threats (or, if you will, opportunities). The
question I ask is how the regulatory framework should be altered to
accommodate the forces of change while protecting what is precious in
the lawyers’ world, our core values and especially the assurance of our
clients’ trust. My thesis is that these forces cannot be stopped, though
they can be slowed and they can be pushed underground. Rules refusing
to recognize the conduct these forces encourage may lead to sanctions
against the occasional lawyer or nonlawyer who is snared in the high
beam of a regulator’s patrol car. But many others will speed along on
back roads undetected. That is not healthy for the law or the nation.

III. Disruptive Externalities
By disruptive externalities I mean real-world developments that
exert pressure on the traditional regulatory model. Some developments
may be outside the traditional power of the regulator’s authority or
impossible to police effectively. One example is computer programs that
73
dispense legal advice to consumers. Two other examples of conduct that
74
defy effective regulation are virtual cross-border advice and legal
75
process outsourcing (“LPO”). Alternatively, a development may be
compliant with existing regulations, or even promoted by them, but
inspire unanticipated changes. An example is the incipient move toward
76
a uniform bar examination, which may make it difficult to resist
movement toward a national, or at least a multistate, law license. Yet
other examples are the increasing move toward uniformity in legal rules
across U.S. jurisdictions, with differences modest and easy to discover;
the fact that federal law, which is the same everywhere, is pervasive; and
the fact that U.S. law and the law of many nations is available to anyone,
anywhere, with a computer terminal and a subscription to Lexis or
Westlaw.
These developments and others can be sliced, diced, and
recombined in various ways. Whatever the organization, however, the

73.
74.
75.
76.

See infra text accompanying notes 118–124.
See infra text accompanying notes 102–110.
See infra text accompanying notes 131–142.
See supra text accompanying notes 48–52.
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lesson, I contend, is the same: The nineteenth- and twentieth-century
regulatory models will buckle under the weight of the twenty-first
century’s innovations. Buckle, not collapse, but still no longer fully
serviceable. Comparison to print media helps explain some of the
disruption. What print media—newspapers and magazines—sell is
information (fact and opinion) and little else. The effect of technology on
the media’s business model is by now well known, although solutions
77
remain elusive. How can the media generate the required revenue from
subscriptions and advertisements when a consumer no longer needs to
buy a hard-copy publication and when online competition is offering
commodity news (in other words, news everyone has, like what the
78
President said yesterday) or “news” that exploits the labors of others?
Like the print media, a lawyer sells information, though she sells
other services as well, including performance skills (in litigation and
negotiation). But many legal services consist solely of an explanation of
what the law is, often followed by the application of legal rules to the
client’s particular circumstances, which may include creation of a
document. Documents are information tailored to a particular need and
may demand little or no legal judgment or customizing, depending on the
complexity of the client’s objective. The same delivery system—the
Internet—that is disrupting the news media has changed and will
continue to change the way legal services are marketed. Indeed, when we
look at the disruptive externalities in combination, which I presently do,
it can seem near to delusional to think that the geocentric model for
regulating lawyers and legal services, or justifications for that model that
rely on differences in the laws across U.S. jurisdictions, can continue as is.
A. Lawyers Without Borders
1. Virtual Presence, Part One
A simple story that reveals the fading of place as a basis for lawyer
79
regulation concerns a lawyer named Cedar P. Carlton. This story may
turn out to be one of those otherwise unremarkable, indeed entirely
forgettable, decisions that signifies the need to revamp the regulatory
model precisely because of its ordinariness.
Ms. Carlton worked for a Washington, D.C. law firm. She was a
member of the D.C. bar and the bar of the District Court for the District

77. See, e.g., Russell Baker, Goodbye to Newspapers?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 16, 2007; Michael
Massing, The End of News?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Dec. 1, 2005; David Carr, The Fall and Rise of Media,
N.Y. Times (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/business/media/30carr.html.
78. That vehicle, the aggregator, is now ubiquitous. Prominent examples include The Huffington
Post and Slate.
79. In re Carlton, 708 F. Supp. 2d 524 (D. Md. 2010).
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80

of Maryland. In 2008 she applied to renew her district court
81
membership. Her application revealed that she lived in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and did most of her work “from home or from an office
82
83
space in Boston.” She was not a member of the Massachusetts bar.
The district court’s local rule required that lawyers admitted to its bar
“must be, and continuously remain, a member in good standing of the
highest court of any state (or the District of Columbia) in which the
attorney maintains his or her principal law office, or the Court of Appeals
84
of Maryland.” The district court asked Ms. Carlton to advise “how her
office in Washington, D.C. can be her principal office if she is spending
the majority of her time in Massachusetts either at home or in an
85
office” —a fair question.
Ms. Carlton’s response, in essence, was that her office was not
86
where she lived or worked but where she virtually practiced. Her mail
87
was sent to Washington, D.C. and forwarded to Cambridge. Her clients
88
called her on a D.C. phone number. Hard-copy communications,
including pleadings, were mailed from D.C. Electronic communications
89
could be sent from anywhere including Cambridge. She did not hold
90
herself out as a lawyer in Massachusetts and had no clients there. So far
as the world was concerned, she was professionally invisible in
91
Massachusetts.
The court recognized the new world. It approved her application,
writing:
In recent years, the concept of a “principal law office” has evolved
somewhat as a result of significant advances in technology which
provide an attorney with the flexibility to carry out a variety of
activities at different locations and under varying circumstances. The
term does not necessarily mean continuous physical presence but, at a
minimum, it requires some physical presence sufficient to assure
accountability of the attorney to clients and the court. Under the
circumstances described by Ms. Carlton, there can be no question that
for purposes of malpractice insurance coverage, tax obligations and
client security trust fund obligations, her office is the office of her
employer. In addition, the address utilized in pleadings, correspondence

80. Id. at 525.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Dist. Md. R. 701.1(a)).
85. Id. (quoting Judge Peter J. Messitte, Chair of the Disciplinary and Admissions Committee of
the Washington, D.C. Bar).
86. Id. at 525–26.
87. Id. at 526.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 525.
91. Id.
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with clients, letterhead and other matters is also the address of her
employer, which maintains a substantial physical presence in
Washington, D.C. When meetings with clients are required, Ms. Carlton
does meet with them in Washington, D.C. Her client files, accounting
records and other business records, library and communication facilities
such as telephone and fax service are all located in Washington, D.C.
although, by virtue of advances in technology, she is able to access
92
them remotely from Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The court tried to distinguish Ms. Carlton’s situation from that of a
93
lawyer whose presence in a jurisdiction was “a mere ‘mail drop.’” It
would not allow so slim a nexus because a mail drop would not “assure
accountability of the lawyer to the court and to clients . . . . Where the
principal law office is not located where the attorney is a member of the
94
bar, essential public oversight of the attorney’s practice is diminished.”
I appreciate that the court did not want to go out too far on a limb,
but the line between a mail drop and Ms. Carlton’s situation is not selfevident. Indeed, the term “mail drop” has no precise meaning. Nor is it
clear why a mail drop (however defined) impedes oversight. Probably
thousands of lawyers move yearly from one state to another, leaving not
even a mail drop behind, while maintaining bar membership in both the
old and new places. Or a lawyer who once would have opted for a mail
drop can now approximate Ms. Carlton’s situation in Washington, D.C.,
yet rarely appear there. As with Ms. Carlton, the world will think that
professionally she is in a place that she is not.
In any event, this ruling reveals a thoroughly modern view and we
might expect more of the same. Ms. Carlton could practice D.C. or
Maryland law from anyplace so long as she maintained a modest physical
connection to Washington. If she could practice from anyplace
95
(including, as the court realized, by “telecommut[ing]” ), how can place
remain as a principal basis for regulation?
2. Virtual Presence, Part Two
Perhaps you wonder about Massachusetts’s interest in all this. The
federal court in Maryland may be content, but Ms. Carlton is practicing
law while physically in Massachusetts. Similarly, Richard Granat lives
full time in Florida, where he is not admitted. As the ABA Journal
described his work in its “Legal Rebels” series:

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 526–27.
Id. at 527.
Id.
Id.
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Granat works out of his house in Palm Beach Gardens, Fla. The floor
in his home office serves as a filing system, and he uses three
computers simultaneously—a Macintosh desktop to watch Twitter
feeds and stock quotes, a PC for actual work and a MacBook Air to
walk around with when the desk chair bothers his back.
Fifteen employees, who also work remotely, help Granat run his
different businesses.

....
One [of Granat’s websites], MDFamilyLawyer.com, offers family law
forms bundled at a fixed price with legal advice to residents in
Maryland and Washington, D.C., where Granat is licensed. Users
answer a set of questions—how many children they have, their
separation date, whether they own property—generating a form for
court filings. Contested cases are referred elsewhere.
Granat spends about 30 minutes daily with that site, and it earns him
about $100,000 a year. The site focuses on simple matters; he estimates
that only about 10 percent of the users require forms with customized
language.
Another site, DirectLaw, licenses Granat’s technology to small firms
and solo practitioners. Once the site gets 50 users, he plans to create a
community for them—to exchange ideas and “let them complain about
96
me.”

In response to the possibility that the Florida Bar would deem him
to be practicing in the state, Granat replied:
I only serve Maryland residents which I check when they register for
my web site. Moreover, I have an official Maryland law firm address in
Owings Mills, Maryland and a Maryland phone number which calls
forward to my Florida number. Our web servers are actually located in
Maryland. I attend bar events in Maryland and participate in CLE
events in Maryland.
I have no “business contacts” in Florida related to the delivery of legal
services, and have no relationship as a lawyer to Florida’s citizens.
Obviously I never serve Florida residents, as my web site makes clear.
I am subject to Maryland disciplinary rules of course, which don’t on
[their] face state that I have to live in Maryland, or in fact even
maintain an office in Maryland which I do. I maintain a malpractice
policy through a Maryland insurer.
So who should care where I live, as long as Maryland’s citizens are
protected from the potential or actual malpractice. . . .
In the age of the Internet, the idea that a state bar would exercise
jurisdiction of a lawyer who resides in its state, but practices elsewhere
and doesn’t offer its services to the state residents, is in my opinion an
over reaching which won’t stand a judicial test. This is a case that I
97
would be happy to defend.

96. Stephanie Francis Ward, Richard Granat: Internet Obsessive, ABA J. Legal Rebels (Aug. 24,
2009, 3:19 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/internet_obsessive.
97. Richard Granat, Comment to Living in FL, Practice in MD and DC, $100M p/a for 30
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As would I. But under the nineteenth-century regulatory model, it is
98
not the law you practice, it is where you practice law. Granat is in
Florida physically but his practice is in Maryland virtually. Should that
free him from the constraints of Florida regulation? Of course. But once
99
we say as much, we have to rethink regulation based on physical place.
3. Virtual Law Offices
A laptop with an Internet connection allows us to “talk” to
colleagues, clients, and adversaries as though we were in the office next
door or a building across town. And it accommodates international calls
100
for next to nothing using Skype or other voice-over-Internet services.
Lawyers have remarked to me that even when in their office, they

Minutes Per Day, Legal Ethics Forum (Aug. 28, 2009, 9:26 AM), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/
blog/2009/08/living-in-fl-practice-in-md-and-dc-100m-pa-for-30-minutes-per-day.html#comments.
98. Not in these precise words, but in effect, that was the basis for denying a lawyer a $4 million
fee in Servidone Construction Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 911 F. Supp. 560, 571, 576
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying a fee in a matter to a lawyer who practiced from an office in New York,
where he was not admitted, notwithstanding that the matter was before federal courts outside New
York, where he was admitted).
99. But see Gould v. Fla. Bar, 259 F. App’x 208, 210 (11th Cir. 2007). A New York lawyer living in
Florida wanted to counsel persons in Florida, who might be residents of Florida, New York, or
elsewhere, but on New York law only. The court upheld the bar’s argument that the work would be
unlawful:
We first address Gould’s challenge to the regulation of his proposed advertisement for
the provision of legal services relating to New York legal matters from his Florida office.
Gould complains that he has a credible fear of prosecution for publishing the following
advertisement:
NEW YORK LEGAL MATTERS ONLY
M. RONALD GOULD LICENSED NEW YORK
ATTORNEY 1201 BRICKELL AVENUE, STE. 630
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33131
FREE PHONE CONSULTATION 305 865 2962
The Florida Bar responds that the proposed advertisement concerns unlawful activity.
We agree with the Florida Bar. Under Florida law, it is unlawful for “[a]ny person not
licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in [Florida]” to practice law within the
State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 454.23 (2004). Gould, who is not admitted to the Florida Bar,
does not have the authority to practice New York law in Florida. . . . Because the proposed
advertisement concerns unlawful activity, the Florida Bar is entitled to regulate the
advertisement.
Id. What is the difference between what Gould wished to do and what Granat does? Only the
presumed physical location of the client and the fact that Granat’s work is, in a sense, invisible in
Florida, whereas Gould wished to advertise his services there. I say “presumed physical location”
because so far as Granat can know, a person using his Maryland or D.C. law website may be doing so
while spending the winter in Florida. But Granat is meeting his client in cyberspace, not Florida space.
When we begin to make these distinctions, it should be apparent that the traditional model of
regulation is flirting with a journey to Wonderland.
100. Voice-over-Internet services like Skype allow a user to call from one computer to another, or
from a computer to a landline phone or cell phone. See Support, Skype, http://support.skype.com/en-us
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
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communicate with colleagues down the hall or a floor above via email,
not in person. The same is true in my law school. As video conferencing
becomes seamless and crisper, any lingering sense that meetings should
occur in physical space will be seen as sentimental. All but long and
important meetings will rapidly succumb to convenience and cost. I
predict that jury trials will remain live and in person, but many trials to
101
judges and arguments will be held in virtual courtrooms. Why not?
Here, we may return to the two lawyers whose practices started the
investigation of the place of anyplace: Cedar Carlton and Richard
102
Granat. Each had a physical office bigger than a mail drop, which the
Maryland federal district court said it would not tolerate, though it did
not define the term. But what need is there for an office at all, even a
mail drop, except to get mail? Why can’t a practice take place in virtual
reality only? Of course, some practices will not lend themselves, at least
not easily, to an entirely virtual existence. Examples are large corporate
deals that require conference rooms and day-long meetings, and complex
civil litigation with depositions and document discovery by the carload.
But many practices should be able to fit in a virtual world. Meetings if
necessary can occur in physical space—a coffee shop, a hotel lobby or
conference room, or even a park, but often meetings will not be
necessary or desirable. A lawyer can do her work at home or at a bar
association library table. The only addresses on her card will be for her
website and email and the only number will be for her cell phone.
As it happens, state bar ethics committees in two neighboring states
confronted the question of a virtual law office (“VLO”) in 2010 and
disagreed. Two New Jersey court committees disapproved of a virtual
office on the grounds that a lawyer needs a physical office in the state to

101. Discussion of “virtual courtrooms” has been underway for more than a decade. Michigan has
created “cyber courts” as courts of record. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.8001 (2011) (making these
courts available with consent in commercial cases and subject to other conditions); see Fredric I.
Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today’s—and Tomorrow’s—HighTechnology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 799 (1999). We cannot, of course, know what rules will
govern the virtual courtroom of the future, nor the kinds of matters for which they may be available.
We can be confident, however, that technology increasingly will make them possible. The prospect
that lawyers will on occasion choose a virtual courtroom for the argument of a motion or an appeal is
unremarkable. Lawyers today submit motions and appeals without any argument, as anyone who has
ever sat through a calendar call knows firsthand. Factors that will influence a lawyer’s decision will
include the perceived benefit from physical presence, if any; the quality of the technology; distance to
the courthouse; cost in legal fees for the time spent in travel; and client preference. Cost to the state
and inconvenience of travel may cause multimember appellate courts to mandate virtual arguments in
categories of matters, say an interlocutory appeal on a nondispositive procedural motion in a state
intermediate appellate court where the judges’ chambers are hundreds of miles apart. I exclude jury
trials as a likely candidate for the virtual courtroom, both civil and criminal, because jurors expect to
be in a physical place (and customarily deliberate in one) and to have the lawyers and witnesses there
as well, an expectation I doubt we will want to deny, especially in criminal cases where the verdict will
affect freedom.
102. See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.2.
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satisfy a court rule requiring a “bona fide office.” Although no lawyer
need be continually at the site, a “responsible person . . . to answer
104
questions posed by the court, clients or adversaries” must be present.
Except for brief periods when the lawyer and a “responsible person” are
absent, a receptionist who is not an employee of the lawyer will not
suffice, not even if the receptionist can easily redirect calls to the lawyer’s
105
cell phone. How do we explain this insistence on physical location?
What difference does it make whether the “responsible person” is at a
desk in an office in a building on a street or is instead available from
anywhere by phone, with in-person meetings arranged as required? The
value we want to protect is availability, not availability in a defined
physical place.
By contrast, a Pennsylvania State Bar ethics opinion fully supported
106
the use of a VLO. A lawyer with a VLO need not have a physical
address anywhere and may use a post office box for mail, the opinion
107
said. Like lawyers in real space, she must be able to confirm the
108
identity of clients and others. A virtual law firm may consist of more
than one attorney, each working from an undisclosed address, even their
109
homes. And perhaps most interesting, the lawyers need not even be
110
working in Pennsylvania. Whether a Pennsylvania lawyer working in
another state, although serving only Pennsylvania clients virtually, runs
afoul of the other state’s unauthorized practice rules is not an issue the
committee addressed. Could Massachusetts or Florida stop Cedar Carlton
or Richard Granat? It is doubtful, but why would they even wish to try?
4. Online Legal Research
At one time, lawyers needed books, the number and kind depending
on the nature of their practice. Books required space and could be
transported easily only in small numbers. The books anchored the
lawyers to a physical place. Technology has erased physical place as the
repository of legal information. It has eliminated the corporality of the
sources of law and made quaint the place that once housed them—the
law library. Unlike the effect of technology on the place of lawyers, here
its effect is on the place of the information lawyers need to work. Who
today depends on the law library for research? Our law libraries are now
digital, so the law of nearly anywhere is available nearly anywhere. It is

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Comm. on Attorney Adver., Joint Op. 718/41 (2010).
Id. (quoting N.J. Disciplinary Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1:21-1(a)).
Id.
Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2010-200 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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only a matter of time before the law library, as we have known it for
centuries, disappears. The few that remain will be more in the nature of
museums, containing books, manuscripts, and archives that for economic,
historical, or legal reasons have not been digitized.
The change in the source of legal information means lawyers now
take their law libraries with them. Thousands of pages of information can
be transported in a laptop (or accessed on a computer anywhere)
equipped with a fast Internet connection and a Westlaw or Lexis
password. The hard copy that anchored us to place is history, and with it
so is one of the few obstacles to the practice of law from anywhere.
Though the effect may be less dramatic than for other developments,
technology further undermines reliance on physical place by allowing us
to access on that same laptop, via a flash drive, a virtual private network,
or a “cloud,” any documents we may need to do our work, including
drafts of contracts and briefs. We can access our office files from ten
thousand miles away. There is no practical limit on volume.
B. Law Without Lawyers
1. Computer Programs
In 1965, Norman Dacey wrote a book called How to Avoid
111
112
Probate. New York lawyers tried to stop its sale. They claimed that
113
through the book Dacey, who was not a lawyer, was practicing law. The
book might have been seen as a threat to the bar’s income because it
coached readers on how to organize their assets so that on death their
property passed to their heirs without going through probate court, which
114
would require paying a lawyer. After some uncertainty, the state high
115
court rejected the effort to ban Dacey’s book. There was the little
116
matter of the First Amendment. Similar efforts to prevent the sale of
forms that consumers could use to represent themselves, often in divorce,
were also unsuccessful unless the seller made the mistake of helping the
buyer fill out the form, no matter how elemental the help, at which point
117
the activity became law practice and unlawful in some states. It was not
the bar’s finest hour.

111. Norman F. Dacey, How to Avoid Probate! (1st ed. 1965).
112. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 987–88 (App. Div. 1967).
113. Id. at 988–89.
114. Dacey, supra note 111, at 10–12.
115. The lower appellate court, over dissent, ruled against Dacey, but the state’s high court
reversed. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 987–88, rev’d 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967).
116. The dissent in the lower court cited the First Amendment, and the Court of Appeals’ opinion
reversing the decision was based on this dissent. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459,
459 (N.Y. 1967).
117. Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1978); Or. State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d
913, 916 (Or. 1975).
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All that became an historical curiosity with the arrival of the
computer. A computer, after all, with seemingly limitless memory and
capacity for interaction with a live user (formerly called “a client”), can
be programmed to do what lawyers do, at least for routine tasks—ask
questions, follow-up questions, and so on, eventually delivering a
document if desired. Dacey sold one book, but a program in a “cloud”
can contain a vast library and accommodate many factual variations and
jurisdictional differences. The monetary stakes are potentially quite high,
which may explain the effort of some Texas lawyers to seek to stop the
118
sale of a program called Quicken Family Lawyer. The district court
119
issued a preliminary injunction, but the case became moot during the
pendency of the appeal, when the Texas legislature amended the state’s
120
unauthorized practice law to allow Quicken’s business.
A computer can do what Norman Dacey could not even dream of
doing: answer questions and produce legal documents tailored to a user’s
particular needs under the law of any jurisdiction. Like a tax preparation
program, a law program can respond to a consumer’s selections with
simple questions, the answers to which determine the next question. It
can do this for estate plans, divorce documents, separation agreements,
contracts for the sale of a home, and simple bankruptcies. It can generate
forms to incorporate a small business, to apply for not-for-profit status,
to create a partnership, to register a trademark or copyright, and to
change a name. It can help a user write a persuasive demand letter in a
dispute with a business, with citations to applicable law. In short,
computer programs can offer products that are part of many lawyers’
inventory of routine services, and will be more effective than traditional
services to the extent that the programs encompass a manageable
universe of options—especially if they are form driven, requiring a “fill in
the blanks” orientation, rather than judgment.
Self-help of this nature is not advisable for all clients. It may be
especially unwise if the matter is complex. But that is not the question. It
121
is available to those who elect it. Predictions that a program will miss
subtleties, while often so, will not prevent their availability, especially for
the routine services that contain few or no subtleties. People who feel
comfortable taking a chance will do so. The state can (and should)
122
require cautions and warnings, as Texas does, but it cannot stop the
118. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:97CV-2859H, 1999
WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 1999), vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff was composed
of six lawyers and three laypersons. Id. at *1.
119. Id.
120. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
121. Apart from proprietary software, a person seeking a simple form, like a power of attorney or
a medical proxy, could use a Google search to find a specific jurisdiction’s valid version of the form.
The attraction of interactive software is enhanced if the user needs guidance in filling in the blanks.
122. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 179 F.3d at 956.
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business. The simple fact is that some legal services can be massproduced, standardized, and commodified. Lawyers have long known
this. As a young lawyer, I was once asked to represent the buyer of a
cooperative apartment. I fretted over the level of sophistication required
until an older lawyer told me that the necessary “fill in the blanks” forms
were available for a few dollars at the stationery store. Other tasks were
required, too, but the standard forms greatly simplified the work.
Now, unlike Dacey, presumably the worker bees who write the
programs are lawyers (though not lawyers in every user’s jurisdiction). So
it is not strictly true to say that this situation reflects the sale of law
without lawyers, but the lawyers are so far in the background that a
comparison to the traditional model of the lawyer-client relationship is
unhelpful. So long as the lawyers who write or contribute to the writing
of the law-giving programs do not personally advise the people using
them (we won’t call them clients), directly or through subordinates, the
program cannot be banned any more than the bar could ban Dacey’s
book. I emphasize that the state does have a legitimate interest in
protecting the consumer against sloppy or ignorant work, and offer
123
suggestions of how it might do that, but that interest will not allow a
124
categorical ban.
2. Nonlegal Services
California’s Birbrower decision addressed the conduct of New York
lawyers who came to the state in anticipation of an arbitration. The
majority in a 6–1 opinion found that the New York lawyers sacrificed
their fees for work done physically or (from New York) virtually in
California because their “extensive” presence “in” the state violated its
125
unauthorized practice law. The dissenting judge agreed with the
majority’s conclusion that the lawyers’ presence in California was
126
“extensive.” However, she did not view the lawyer’s work—preparing
127
for an arbitration—as the practice of law. For this conclusion, she had
128
authority from a federal district court in New York. Since Birbrower, at
least two other courts, one state and one federal, have likewise

123. See infra text accompanying notes 213–216.
124. In a variation on this theme, computer programs are replacing human labor in law firms.
While there is still a law firm in the picture, the software does the work that lawyers once did, but
faster and cheaper. John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 4, 2011, at A1 (describing software that reviews documents using a “sociological approach
[that] adds an inferential layer of analysis, mimicking the deductive powers of a human Sherlock
Holmes”).
125. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1998).
126. Id. at 18.
127. Id. at 16 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 18 (citing Williamson v. John D. Quinn Const. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)).
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concluded that representation of a party in a pending or impending
arbitration is not the practice of law, even when (as was true in these
129
three cases) the work is done by a lawyer.
The view that a lawyer advocating in arbitration is not practicing law
draws strength from the conceded fact that an arbitrator need not be a
lawyer, not even if the agreement to arbitrate specifies that the law of a
130
particular jurisdiction will govern the dispute. If the “judge” need not
be a lawyer, why should the advocates have to be lawyers? And if the
advocates do not have to be lawyers, shouldn’t it follow that even if they
are lawyers, their work complies with unauthorized practice rules? It
would be passing strange if a nonlawyer may advocate in an arbitration
but a lawyer admitted in another state may not. So if the dissenting
Birbrower judge and the three courts that agree with her are correct, a
forum in which law is applied and legal rights are determined can operate
without lawyers or with lawyers who are not subject to the jurisdiction’s
rules on unauthorized practice.
3. Legal Process Outsourcing
Legal process outsourcing (“LPO”) is both a new and an old
131
phenomenon. It is old because, at bottom, it is simply the delegation of
some part of a law firm’s legal or support work to another person or
entity outside the firm. A large photocopying job sent to Kinko’s might
be called LPO. So could an independent contractor hired to investigate
an incident or to maintain and ensure security for a law firm’s voicemail,
132
email, and computer systems. We do not seem to use the LPO term
when a firm affiliates with another law firm, either as local counsel or
because of its particular expertise. Perhaps this is because the word
“process” does not fit. So one defining quality of LPO might be whether
the outside organization is a law firm in its own right or only an

129. Prudential Equity Grp., LLC v. Ajamie, 538 F. Supp. 2d 605, 607–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Colmar,
Ltd. v. Fremantlemedia N. Am., Inc., 801 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); see In re Town of
Little Compton, No. 2011-101-M.P., 2012 WL 424385 (R.I. Feb. 9, 2012) (holding that a nonlawyer had
not engaged in unauthorized law practice by representing a union at a labor arbitration).
130. Donna M. Bates, A Consumer’s Dream or Pandora’s Box: Is Arbitration a Viable Option for
Cross-Border Consumer Disputes?, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 823, 857 n.132 (2004).
131. The subject has attracted wide attention. E.g., Heather Timmons, Due Diligence from Afar,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2010, at B1; Passage to India: The Growth of Legal Outsourcing, Economist, June
28, 2010, at 69. The number of organizations offering outsourcing services is large in the United States
and abroad, numbering 140 at the end of 2009. Timmons, supra. Revenue is predicted “to grow to $440
million” in 2010, “up 38 percent from 2008, and should surpass $1 billion by 2014,” according to
Valuenotes, an Indian consultancy. Id. While the bar attempts to identify the precautions required of a
lawyer who employs an LPO on behalf of clients, see, for example, ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 451 (2008), there seems to be no plausible claim that outsourcing is
categorically forbidden.
132. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 398 (1995) (allowing a
firm to give outside service providers access to the firm’s database).
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organization whose work supports the work that a law firm is doing for
the ultimate client.
But what if the LPO entity is not a law firm but the work requires or
benefits from some discretion and legal training? What if it is work that
law firms (or corporate law offices) have traditionally performed for a
client in-house, perhaps using paralegals or new associates? Before it
became feasible and economical to send LPO work abroad, the closest
that U.S. firms came (and still come) to domestic outsourcing of lawrelated work was the use of contract lawyers, who may be supplied by a
133
temporary employment agency. These were lawyers whom the firm
might not hire as full-time employees or who did not want a full-time job
(for example, a person who is a new parent, easing into retirement, or
writing a screenplay). Contracting with them on a project basis avoided
expanding permanent staff and could make the project cheaper, which
appealed to the client. The firm, meanwhile, could still mark up the cost
134
and earn a profit on their time just as it profited from associate time.
The challenging question that once surrounded contract or temporary
lawyers concerned conflicts: Do the same imputation rules that apply to
traditional firm lawyers also apply to temporary lawyers, who move from
firm to firm, possibly monthly? If so, the temporary lawyer industry
could be seriously curtailed, though not shut down. As it happens, after
135
some uncertainty, the answer has been no, as hereafter explained.
Should foreign outsourcing be any different from domestic
outsourcing? True, the work travels across an international border,
whereas the contract lawyer may work on the firm’s premises or in a
domestic venue leased just for them. Should that matter? Surely the fact
that money that once went into the pockets of U.S. lawyers and work
that earned markup profits for partners of U.S. firms are diverted abroad
136
does not raise ethical issues. The point for now is that the profession
has not fussed as much over the dangers of and proper constraints on

133. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 356 (1988).
134. Id.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 143–146.
136. The ABA and the New York City Bar Association agree that if the outsource charge is passed
to the client as a disbursement, there can be no markup, but the firm can bill for its actual costs and
reasonable overhead, if any. There are not likely to be overhead costs if the work is done abroad.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 451 (2008); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on
Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 3 (2006). The ABA opinion, however, seems to envision that the
firm may earn a profit on the outsourced work if the charge is not presented as a disbursement. This is
not likely to be consequential. Clients that require and agree to outsourcing are probably looking to
save money and will insist that the charges be presented without addition, except for the oversight
work of the firm. What is quite clear is that outsourcing redirects a substantial income stream from
traditional law firms to service providers elsewhere. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Leah Cooper:
Passage to India, ABA J. Legal Rebels (Oct. 13, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
legalrebels/article/leah_cooper (reporting that between May and October 2009, outsourcing had saved
the Rio Tinto Group “more than $4 million in legal fees”).
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domestic outsourcing as it has over foreign outsourcing, as evidenced by
137
articles and bar opinions.
Today, it appears likely, although we are still in the formative
period, that foreign outsourcing will survive ethical hurdles that may yet
be put before it. Indeed, no serious claim has been leveled that
outsourcing, whether domestic or foreign, is inherently unethical. The
138
focus has been on how it is done. Insofar as outsourcing remains a
matter of professional attention, it will be in part because the outsourced
tasks are becoming more sophisticated and therefore more threatening
to the domestic legal market and because of growth in the industry.
Instead of reading documents on a screen to decide if they fall within one
of two or three defined categories and must be produced in discovery—
an early outsourced service—we may be moving toward what might be
called knowledge outsourcing. The LPO entity abroad is doing work
closer to the core lawyering tasks of domestic lawyers, thereby greatly
expanding the potential for lost work and income, at least for some legal
specialties and more prominently for younger lawyers. The trend can
only increase. Labor costs can be much lower abroad where there are
legally trained (or trainable) people capable of doing increasingly
139
sophisticated work. Many may have studied in United States or other
140
common-law schools and some may be members of a U.S. bar.
In outsourcing, there remains a U.S. lawyer between the client and
the workers abroad—presumably reviewing and accepting responsibility
for the work. But outsourcing also entails law without lawyers. What we
recognize as a legal service—a description that will become increasingly
accurate as the outsourced work becomes more specialized—will be

137. See supra note 136; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics 20/20, Sample Bibliography, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ethics_2020/outsourcing_bibliography.
authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
138. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 451 (2008). Opinions like this
one address protection of client confidences, the duty of competence and diligence in selecting the
outsource provider, conflicts of interest, aiding unauthorized law practice, and how the cost may be
passed on to the client.
139. The size and growth of the industry is illustrated in the submissions to the ABA Commission
on Ethics 20/20. See ABA Comm. on Ethics 20/20, Legal Process Outsourcing Comments &
Summaries, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ethics_2020/
outsourcing_comments.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Pangea3, one of the largest
companies in the industry and owned by Thomson Reuters, offers legal research, contract drafting and
revision, and e-discovery review, among other services. Solutions, Pangea3, http://www.pangea3.com/
legal-outsourcing-services.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
140. In 2010, 4596 foreign educated lawyers took the New York bar examination. A total of 5761
such lawyers took an American bar examination. Persons Taking and Passing the 2010 Bar
Examination by Source of Legal Education, Bar Examiner, Mar. 2011, at 10, 11 [hereinafter 2010
Statistics]. Because of the bar admission requirements in New York and elsewhere, the great majority
of these applicants have an American J.D. or LL.M., a degree from a common-law school, or both. For
conditions for foreign-educated lawyers to take the New York and California bar examinations, see
infra text accompanying notes 235–253.
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performed by workers who are not admitted to a U.S. bar or any bar; or,
if some are lawyers somewhere, the organization they work for may not
be a law firm. The U.S. lawyer intermediary cannot review all of their
work, otherwise the outsourcing would save no money and might as well
be done by a lawyer at home.
Foreign LPO is not merely an interesting development made
possible by the ease of sending documents abroad instantly (and perhaps
141
having the work done during America’s night). It is a big business. But
it eliminates local jobs. Money that clients of U.S. firms save is money
U.S. lawyers do not earn. Lawyers have now joined other providers of
goods and services in seeing their work done more cheaply abroad. Like
computers, televisions, and cars, law is a product produced elsewhere and
exported to the United States (if only as “parts” of the final product). If
the ability is there and the price differential remains large, the amount and
sophistication of the redirected work will continue to grow.
Recently, we have seen examples of domestic outsourcing of legal
work to an entity that is not a law firm but that hires lawyers to handle
142
the work. This reversal of work back to the United States may have
been encouraged by creation of excess legal talent in a contracting
market for firm lawyers. A domestic LPO may have the further
advantage of a staff of admitted American lawyers and whatever comfort
to clients that keeping the work in-country affords. It is too soon to say
whether the reverse trend will continue if law firm hiring returns to
earlier levels or if the cost differences are large.
C. Law Without Law Firms
1. Nonconventional Firms
Just as a labyrinth of rules governs who can be a lawyer “in” a place,
another set of rules defines the practice settings in which lawyers may
work. Three settings dominate: private law offices, counsel offices of
private for-profit and nonprofit organizations, and government. (Public
interest law firms will fall within the second category.) But a fourth
player may be on the horizon, fostered by other developments discussed
here, especially technology.

141. See supra note 131.
142. See Heather Timmons, Where Lawyers Find Work, N.Y. Times, June 3, 2011, at B1. Pillsbury
Winthrop has chosen to keep its outsourcing not only in the U.S. but also in-house. Law Firm Service
Center in Nashville Could Employ 150, Tennessean (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.nashvillechamber.com/
Homepage/NewsEvents/News/11-10-18/Law_firm_service_center_in_Nashville_could_employ_150.aspx.
The firm reported that the internal service center “will provide back-office services such as
information technology, finance, client intake, word processing and other non-legal professional
services for [the firm’s] 14 offices worldwide.” Id.
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As introduced in the outsourcing discussion above, in the 1980s,
bar ethics committees were asked to address the growing phenomenon of
temporary lawyers, now sometimes called contract lawyers. These were
individuals admitted to the bar and hired to work on discrete matters for
a limited period of time. A firm may have a large antitrust case and need
many lawyers to sift through documents, but when the case or the
discovery has ended, the lawyers will no longer be needed. The firm does
not want to increase permanent staff. Of course, such an arrangement
presents no problem whether the lawyers are hired temporarily or
retained as independent contractors. However, because these lawyers
often work through employment agencies that receive payment, one
question was whether the agency’s fee would violate the rule against
splitting a legal fee with a nonlawyer. A law firm might sometimes pay
the agency the full amount due the lawyer for each week of work, and
the agency would then subtract its fee and send the lawyer the balance.
Bar groups concluded that the arrangement did not violate the rule
144
against splitting fees with nonlawyers.
The more challenging question concerned conflicts of interest. If a
temporary lawyer has worked at a law firm representing party A in the
matter of A v. B, could she then work for the law firm that represented
party B, even if she is hired to work on a completely unrelated matter
involving different parties? At the time (and still), a significant number
of U.S. jurisdictions did not recognize screening of lateral lawyers to
avoid imputation of conflicts or did (and do) so only in limited
145
circumstances. So if our lawyer had been a permanent employee of the
firm representing party A and then moved to the firm representing party
B, the rules in these jurisdictions would impute the lawyer’s conflict to
the second firm’s lawyers, who could not then continue to represent
party B without informed client consent. That in turn meant that the
lawyer might not get an offer from the second firm as long as the A v. B
matter was pending. While such a disability might be inconvenient for
permanent employees, if applied to temporary lawyers, whose
professional lives are characterized by frequent migration between firms,
it would seriously limit their capacity to work and the business of the
agencies that supplied them. Eventually, bar ethics committees concluded
that the lateral temporary lawyer could be screened even if the lateral
146
permanent employee could not be screened.

143. See supra text accompanying notes 133–135.
144. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 356, at 47 (1988); N.Y.C.
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2 (1989).
145. As of 2011, the rules of twenty-four U.S. jurisdictions recognized screening of lateral lawyers
moving from private practice to avoid conflict imputation at least in some circumstances. ABA,
Lateral Lawyer Screening Status (Jan. 11, 2011).
146. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 356, at 41 (1988).
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It could have ended there. But then an associate at a large New
York firm realized that the doctrinal authority for temporary lawyers and
the agencies that furnish them could also support assembly of teams of
specialists, not merely individual lawyers to perform low discretionary
147
work. That associate created a company called Axiom, where such
teams are available to work on particular assignments requiring greater
skill and knowledge than generally required of contract lawyers. The
teams can disband when their assignments end. Team members might
then recombine, possibly with other lawyers, for a new assignment and so
on. Each project can attract its own team depending on availability and
expertise. Formally, each of the assembled lawyers is an Axiom employee
working for a client on a temporary or contract basis. Members of the
team do not have a formal relationship with each other. They do not
comprise a law firm. But in reality, they will be chosen for their
complementary skills. The work they do is more sophisticated than was
true in the early days of temporary lawyer agencies and still true for
many contract lawyers today.
The rules governing lawyers say that only lawyers may have an
148
equity interest or management authority in for-profit firms. The
prohibition is justified on a questionable but durable assumption. If
powerful nonlawyers in law firms are positioned to influence the
compensation and status of firm lawyers, they may cause the lawyers to
violate ethical obligations if they believe that doing so will enhance the
finances of the firm and therefore their own. Unlike lawyers, the
nonlawyers are not governed by legal ethics rules, do not have to worry
about professional discipline, and might be quite willing to violate duties
to clients, courts, or others in order to enrich themselves, or so it has
been explained. This danger is seen as so great that it has been deemed
necessary to categorically ban nonlawyers from any financial interest in
149
law firms no matter what steps might be taken to ensure good conduct.
Axiom owes its existence to these early bar association opinions on
150
temporary lawyers. It is not a law firm and would not dare call itself a
law firm, although it is often described as such in press stories, some of

147. The following information about Axiom and its origins is drawn from my conversations on
August 17, 2011, and October 28, 2011, with Mark Harris, one of its founders. For a description of
Axiom’s work and how it describes itself, see the company’s website. Axiom Law, www.axiomlaw.com
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
148. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2010).
149. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 10 cmt. b (2000). How this exclusion
squares with the fact that nonlawyers are trusted to behave in other important areas of life, including
on corporate boards and heads of powerful organizations, is hard to explain. It is equally hard to
understand how, in light of this policy, we can tolerate lawyers working in-house for corporate clients
where the lawyer’s job and her conditions of employment are at the mercy of the company’s control
persons.
150. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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151

which are reproduced on its website. One advantage of not being a law
firm is that Axiom can be owned and managed by nonlawyers. That
means it can raise money in the capital markets, which law firms cannot
152
do. To an outsider, Axiom looks like a law firm, and it does not seek to
dispel that impression. Its website, despite avoidance of the term “law
firm” in its own voice, conveys the impression that it is a law firm,
153
including by reproducing news stories so labeling it. So it has the best
of two worlds. It manages to present itself as a law firm—now with a staff
of 700 in eleven offices globally—while also enjoying the capital
formation options available to for-profit enterprises. And by virtue of the
temporary agency ethics opinions, its lawyers are able to form and
disband teams unencumbered by the conflict rules that can hamper
154
Nor is Axiom beholden to a
movement of traditional lawyers.
155
jurisdiction’s rules on lawyer advertising, although its lawyers are.
The doctrinal underpinnings for Axiom’s business model likely
would not have been sufficient to sustain it at its present size were it not
for technology and the insignificance of place that technology makes
possible. That is, in the pre-Internet era, Axiom lawyers might have
needed temporarily to relocate physically to do a job efficiently, creating
unauthorized practice risks. For some, that need likely would have
precluded the arrangement or been personally disruptive. While that
could still be so for some projects, technology means that a “temporary”
or project-based law firm need not exist in physical space.
It is too soon to know if Axiom itself will survive or grow. But the
156
business model has appeal. It offers “money people” a way to invest in
the law industry. For lawyers, work via Axiom is not necessarily a full
time job. This can be attractive to lawyers who need or want flexible
schedules because of other work (or creative endeavors) or demands on

151. See, e.g., Steven T. Taylor, Tomorrow: A Sneak Preview: For These Firms the Future Is Now,
L. Practice, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 38 (“In 2000 Harris and an entrepreneur friend, Alec Guettel, cofounded Axiom Law—a very different law firm with a very different business model.” (emphasis
added)).
152. Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 5.4 (2010).
153. See supra note 151.
154. See supra text accompanying note 147.
155. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.1–7.5 (2010).
156. Other startups also have identified ways to bring investor capital to the legal services market.
See, e.g., Jonathan O’Connell, Outside GC Joins Rush to Offer Discount Legal Services in Washington,
Wash. Post (May 22, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/outside-gc-joinsrush-to-offer-discount-legal-services-in-washington/2011/05/19/AF4MWF9G_story.html;
Jonathan
O’Connell, New Washington Law Firm Looks to Break the Billable-Hour Mold, Wash. Post, (May 8,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/new-washington-law-firm-looks-to-breakthe-billable-hour-mold/2011/05/05/AFYl4sRG_story.html (reporting on Clearspire Law, PLLC). One
challenge to this model is that the availability of work depends on the volume and type of assignments
to the company. A law firm may carry lawyers whose skills are not in high demand at the moment, but
companies like Axiom pay for actual work, which means the work has to be there.

Gillers_22 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

May 2012]

A PROFESSION, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT

4/19/2012 6:17 PM

989

their time (for instance, caring for children) or because they are
semiretired or between jobs.
2. Reverse Publishers
In 1994, a young lawyer named Dov Seidman formed Legal Research
157
Network (today called LRN), which offered a way for clients to save
money on legal research. Not only would outsourcing the research to
LRN be cheaper than paying law firm rates, but the work might then be
158
shared with other paying clients, reducing the cost to each.
Say a client wants a memorandum on one of the following subjects
in multiple jurisdictions: Can an employer choose to exclude smokers
and enforce the ban with testing? What are the limits on expiration of
gift certificates? What are the federal and state laws concerning the sale
of leads collected on a website? These are generic questions but focused
on specific conduct. A client can ask a law firm to do the research, pay
for it, and own it. That indeed was the traditional method. Put aside
whether the firm can resell the same research to another client (and at
what price). If the question is not too specialized, it is certainly possible
that another company will pose it to a different law firm and then pay for
the same research. Alternatively, another company might not be willing
to commission the work elsewhere but would be happy to pay for a copy
of the original memorandum at a reduced cost. And the first client might
be willing to allow that if it meant a lower price and if the work was
stripped of confidential information.
At one time, LRN’s website identified each of the research topics
just discussed as the subject of an actual client memorandum. The
company no longer appears to offer legal research services—and the
website no longer contains these examples—but other companies do the
159
same work and also identify sharing as a way to reduce cost. Think of
this as reverse publishing. While a traditional publisher will print a

157. LRN, http://www.lrn.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Today, LRN’s website offers ethics and
compliance training for companies. How We Help Organizations: Building Culture from the Ground
Up, LRN, http://www.lrn.com/how-we-help-organizations/lrn-communication-education (last visited
Mar. 17, 2012).
158. D.M. Osborne, Should You Be Afraid of This Man?, Am. Lawyer, June 1995, at 111. This
article, a profile of Seidman and his then-fledgling company, also describes its plan for “repackaging
research and selling it in what Seidman terms the aftermarket. Thus future sales of memos—or
portions of memos—can make up for the loss leaders of today.” Id.
159. Legal Research Center offers to sell “existing multijurisdictional surveys in our growing
library.” Multijurisdictional Surveys, Legal Res. Center, http://www.legalresearch.com/services-andproducts/research-and-writing/multijurisdictional-surveys.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). National
Legal Research Group, Inc., offers “legal research white papers” for purchase. Purchase Legal Research
White Papers, Nat’l Legal Res. Group, http://www.nlrg.com/legal-content/legal-whitepapers-forpurchase/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). One paper, which costs $50, is entitled Employer and Law Firm
Website Liability, Nat’l Legal Res. Group, http://www.nlrg.com/legal-content/employer-and-law-firmwebsite-liability/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
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number of books and hope for enough buyers to pay production costs
and a profit, reverse publishers do the opposite. The first client to
authorize the work may be willing to let the reverse publisher promote
its resale (without revealing the identity of the client) on an as-ordered
basis. The charge to the client likely will be lower than if it requested the
same research from a traditional law firm for its exclusive use, both
because the research costs can be lower and because the reverse
publisher may be able to amortize that cost among other prospective
buyers. (It will have to estimate how many those may be.) When an
order comes in, a reverse publisher can ask an expert to do the research
on a freelance basis, or it can use its own staff. For this to work, the
questions cannot be too specialized. The reverse publisher can keep the
memorandum on file for years and update it as needed in response to
new requests. It can even encourage additional buyers and print copies to
order.
Now, a reverse publisher need not be a law firm. But when it
answers questions like those cited here, it is selling legal knowledge as
conventionally understood. It can avoid the rigors of unauthorized
practice rules if it does not apply the fruits of its research to the
160
particular facts confronting the client. The memorandum, though made
to order, is like a book—a very specialized book—but not law practice.
Law firms and corporate legal departments may use these research
companies to save money. And because a reverse publisher is not a law
firm, it can seek lay investors and have nonlawyer managers.
And yet we cannot ignore the fact that this nonlaw firm has created
a supply chain that provides legal advice. The authors of the research
memoranda are unlikely to be lawyers in the jurisdiction in which the
ultimate clients reside. They are selling their legal skills to an entity in
the form of a product and the firm then sells that product in the form of a
memorandum to clients, most likely through the clients’ lawyers. If the
authors sold the same memorandum to the ultimate recipient directly,
161
they would risk a charge of unauthorized law practice. But because of
the intermediaries between the creator and final user of the work, and
because the memoranda answer generic (but nonetheless focused)
questions, somehow, magically, rules governing lawyers and law practice
are not a threat. Care must be taken not to make the question too
specific to the situation of the client in order to avoid any claim that the

160. It also avoids the risk of unauthorized practice of law if it funnels its research through the
client’s law firm or general counsel’s office. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 451 (2008) (noting that a lawyer’s supervision of outsourced work will avoid an unauthorized
law practice claim).
161. See Crain v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 11 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Tex. App. 1999)
(“The practice of law embraces, in general, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law.”).
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intermediary is practicing law (or that the researchers are in law practice
with nonlawyers). But a reverse publisher has the same interest. If the
question is too specific it will be of interest to only one buyer and the
economies of scale that inspire this business and make it efficient and
profitable will be lost.
If an organization can be a back-office legal research arm of an inhouse corporate law department or a law firm, and I can see no rule that
prevents it, then legal research can also be outsourced abroad. We can
162
imagine a new generation of LPO organizations. There is no need for
the entity or the researchers to be in the United States or for the
researchers to be U.S. lawyers. The researchers need not be lawyers at all
if the market will accept them. This is certainly true if the organization is
working through a lawyer intermediary who at least nominally is
supervising (taking responsibility for) the work; and it is probably true—
at least if the assignment is general enough—even if the organization is
working directly for the ultimate user. If the researcher is located abroad,
there is little or nothing a U.S. court can do to stop her in any event
although it might have jurisdiction over the company for which she
works. The market will identify whether it has confidence in the quality
of the work, which encourages legal research organizations, whether
163
domestic or foreign, to use credentialed researchers.
3. Multidisciplinary Practice
In the space where lawyers and nonlawyers may do the same things,
lawyers have the option of taking their work out of a law firm and
relocating it in a different setting. Tax lawyers have long been willing, if
164
the incentives are strong, to take their skills to accounting firms. These

162. And indeed, LPOs have moved into the field of legal research. See supra text accompanying
notes 138–139; see also Legal Research and Drafting, Integreon, (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.integreon.com/
solutions/legal-solutions/legal-research-drafting.html. Integreon, an LPO, offers legal research services,
describing the work this way:
Working with Integreon’s onshore or offshore lawyers, you can accelerate legal research
and even reduce costs up to 50% by using offshore resources. By integrating a dedicated
Integreon legal research team into your corporate legal department or as an extension of
your firm, you benefit from a truly global legal talent pool spread across four continents.
Our onshore research specialists have a range of domain experience and excellent online
research skills. Our dedicated teams of offshore lawyers have work experience at law firms,
in corporate legal departments, or in private practice in India, the Philippines, the U.S., and
the U.K.
163. It bespeaks the fluid nature of the new categories of entities that deliver legal services that
legal research companies can be viewed as nonlaw firms selling law or as LPOs providing research aid
to an ultimate client through their lawyers. What puts some of these companies closer to the first
category is the fact that the memoranda are written by lawyers and the fact that the memoranda need
be absorbed into the work product of the lawyer who requests it but can themselves be an end
product.
164. See Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 115, 171–79 (2001).
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transplanted lawyers cannot hold themselves out as doing legal work—
although they can truthfully identify their credentials, including their law
165
degree and even bar membership —and cannot represent clients in
work that only lawyers can do (because lawyers cannot sell legal services
166
via for-profit vehicles that are not law firms ), but their legal training
may provide a competitive advantage and support hourly rates equal to
167
or greater than what they might have charged in law practice.
What has worked in tax practice should work elsewhere. Take, for
example, multidisciplinary practice. The ABA rejected a multidisciplinary
practice proposal that would have allowed lawyers to invite nonlawyers
to join law firms and offer its clients services in addition to legal
168
services. But nothing stops lawyers from joining entities that are not
law firms and partnering with nonlawyers, so long as the service they
offer is not within the lawyers’ monopoly. One candidate for realignment
169
may be compliance work. This service looks a lot like law and may skirt
closely to the lawyers’ realm—after all, compliance with what?—but it is
170
apparently sufficiently distinct to avoid claims of unauthorized practice.
Perhaps that is because defining a rule’s requirements (which is legal
work) is not the same as implementing the requirement (which is
compliance).
Withal, whether it is the tax practitioner or some new hybrid service
(part law, part not), the client is getting the benefit of a lawyer’s training
and judgment even if she does not call herself a lawyer and even if her
organization is not a law firm. Not to be overlooked, however, is the fact
that the work that flows to the organization might otherwise have gone
to a traditional law firm.
D. The Law of Anyplace
This Subpart differs from the earlier discussions of lawyers without
171
borders. That discussion posited that the physical location of the lawyer
has receded (not disappeared) as a useful basis for regulation. Here I

165. See Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 139 (1994) (holding that a
lawyer has a First Amendment right to refer in her advertising to her certification as a financial
planner and public accountant).
166. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2010) (forbidding lawyers to join in a
partnership or practice in a professional corporation that practices law if a nonlawyer is a partner or
has an ownership interest in the corporation).
167. Lawyers who are not in law practice are not subject to the limitations the ethics rules impose
on legal fees. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.5 (2010).
168. See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving
the MDP Debate in America, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2193, 2203 (2010).
169. See Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1397, 1397–
1400 (2006).
170. See id. at 1407–11.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 79–110.
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propose that the governing law also has receded as a useful basis for
regulation. The two predicates—law and place—are distinct. The lawyer
may be in a virtual place, which means the lawyer can be anywhere
physically. Separately, the law that informs the lawyer’s work may have
no connection to the place where the lawyer is. Of course, law, like place,
remains a factor in lawyer regulation. A lawyer has to be some place, and
the law of a place (though not the place the lawyer is), must be an
ingredient in the legal service to which the lawyer’s work contributes.
The premise, however, is that what the law is, like where the lawyer’s
place is, has declining utility to the goals of regulation, including
licensure.
Three interrelated developments have diminished the importance of
home-state law in the inventory of many lawyers and have thereby
contributed to the fading of the law of a place, along with the fading of
place itself, as a useful and effective organizing principle for regulation of
the bar. These developments are: (1) increasing homogeneity and
accessibility of law, (2) increasing lawyer specialization, and (3) the longstanding ability of contracting parties to choose what law will govern
their agreement, the identity and nature of the tribunal that will resolve
any disputes under it, and the location of that tribunal. To appreciate the
import of these factors, we have to go back some decades.
Recall that before the present day (and still), we allowed lawyers
from anywhere to try a case anywhere through the vehicle of pro hac vice
172
173
admission. Not all courts were equally inviting —with some state
courts, and most federal courts especially, generally willing to admit
174
lawyers pro hac vice —but over time pro hac vice admission became
increasingly available as a matter of grace if not as a matter of right.
Admission for the trial of a case is an early example of cross-border
practice authority. Under the ABA Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice
Admission, a pro hac vice applicant must satisfy certain criteria,
including familiarity with local court rules, and may need a home-state
minder, a local lawyer willing to accept responsibility for and to join in
175
the work of the applicant. It was no impediment that the issues before
the host tribunal did not arise under the law of the lawyer’s home state.
Whatever the governing law, which need not be the host-state law, the
lawyer would need to know it, just as she would need to know local
172. See Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission (2002). Every American state and the District
of Columbia has a pro hac vice rule, which vary in liberality. See ABA, Pro Hac Vice Admission
Rules (2011).
173. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 438 (1978) (upholding Ohio’s refusal to admit New York
lawyers to defend a criminal case in Ohio).
174. See Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 605 (3d Cir. 1989). In criminal cases, some courts have
ruled that a defendant has a constitutional right to employ an out-of-state lawyer. See United States v.
Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999).
175. See Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission (2002).
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procedure. The pro hac vice regime treats the lawyer’s trial skills and the
client’s interest in counsel of choice as deserving great respect with little
need formally to test the lawyer’s knowledge of substantive law or
procedural law of the host jurisdiction. After all, even in the lawyer’s
home state, a case may turn on the law of another jurisdiction and yet no
one doubted the right of an admitted lawyer to try a case in her home
state. The host-state litigation could be quite significant—a serious, even
176
a capital, felony. Public interest also favors the practice. The nation has
looked to the availability of out-of-state lawyers as an antidote to local
hostility to a cause or party, as was true during the civil rights era of the
177
1960s.
Pro hac vice admission means we have long had a high comfort level
with a lawyer’s cross-border practice in host-state forums and with nonhome-state law. But it was limited to trial work and appeals (and work
ancillary to a pending court proceeding) and presumed the presence of
an adversary, usually a local lawyer as co-counsel, and a judge, all of
whom could guard against a guest lawyer’s misbehavior or ignorance.
Initially pushing the boundaries of this comfort level were out-ofstate lawyers who entered a host jurisdiction in connection with work for
which no pro hac vice authority was available. That work included all
transactional work and work in anticipation of litigation not yet pending
(and which might never be filed in the host state or anywhere), work in
connection with litigation pending elsewhere, work of lawyers who were
assisting a lawyer admitted pro hac vice, and (as in Birbrower) work in
connection with arbitration or other noncourt tribunals that lacked the
power to grant pro hac vice status. In each instance, an out-of-state
lawyer is in a host state, acting as a lawyer, in connection with work
where the governing law may be host-state law, home-state law, or the
law of a third place. So we have temporary presence for a matter but
without judicial approval. For a long time, this temporary cross-border
practice lacked any official status beyond the occasional court opinion
178
seeking to define its limits in a particular setting. ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.5, adopted in some form in many jurisdictions,
has now recognized what had been happening anyway and, in a national

176. See Flynt, 439 U.S. at 450 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying times in American history that
the availability of out-of-state lawyers has served important values). After Hurricane Katrina hit New
Orleans, the ABA adopted a model rule that enables out-of-state lawyers to come to the site of a
disaster to help with legal needs pro bono without running afoul of unauthorized practice rules. The
rule also allows lawyers whose practices have been disrupted by the disaster to enter other states to
continue their practices during the pendency of the disaster. See Model Court Rule on Provision of
Legal Servs. Following Determination of Major Disaster (2007).
177. See Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392, 395 (E.D. La. 1968).
178. See El Gemayel v. Seaman, 533 N.E.2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1988) (exemplifying a court’s effort to
define the scope of extraterritorial practice).

Gillers_22 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

May 2012]

4/19/2012 6:17 PM

A PROFESSION, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT

995

economy, would continue to happen beyond the power of any state to
179
impede it. The question is whether Rule 5.5 is too restrictive.
Restriction of practice to locally admitted lawyers makes most sense
when the licensing jurisdiction can plausibly differentiate its law from the
law elsewhere. A purpose of licensing is to ensure competence in the law
of the place. If the law were the same nationwide, as federal law is, then
competence one place should be transferable to all places. But if a
jurisdiction’s law is special, it can claim that competence elsewhere
proves little or nothing. Knowing the rules for estate planning or the
statute of frauds in State A doesn’t mean you know these things in State
B (although, of course, you could look it up).
That claim has diminishing weight today for interlocking reasons
that subordinate the importance of knowledge of local law as a basis for
regulation. Federal courts will admit lawyers who are not lawyers in the
180
states in which they sit. That in turn raises the fascinating, but so far
mainly theoretical, question: Can a state prevent an unadmitted lawyer
from opening an office—an announced physical presence—in the state if
her practice is limited to work in a local federal court in which she is
admitted, at least when the federal court has adopted a rule permitting
it? A negative answer, perhaps based on the Supremacy Clause or other
constitutional provision, will put a big dent in state authority physically
to exclude lawyers not licensed by the state. The little existing authority
on this point suggests the answer is that a state may be powerless to
181
prevent the conduct if federal courts wish to allow it.
179. The rule permits temporary practice in a “host” state under four circumstances:
A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended
from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this
jurisdiction that:
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this
jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;
(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this
or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law
or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;
(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other
alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise
out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer
is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice
admission; or
(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to
the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5(c) (2010).
180. See, e.g., N. Dist. Ill. R. 83.10 (“An applicant for admission to the bar of this Court must be a
member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any state of the United States or of the
District of Columbia.”).
181. See, e.g., Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 533 (3rd Cir. 2006) (holding that a Pennsylvania
lawyer suspended by state courts could continue to maintain an office in the state for the purpose of
practicing in federal court, where he was not suspended); In re Desilets, 291 F.3d 925, 931 (6th Cir.
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Beyond uniform federal law is the perception that in many areas,
the laws of the states are increasingly alike. While the trend may be near
impossible to measure with precision, causes of the convergence may lie
in uniform state law efforts, the influence of American Legal Institute’s
Restatements, and the fact that electronic research has given advocates
and judges easy access to decisions of all U.S. jurisdictions. True, some
local variations resist the tendency toward homogenization. These may
include land transfers, local tax law, and family law. Procedural law and
rules of evidence may also vary, but less than one might think given the
influence of the federal rules of procedure and the federal rules of
182
evidence. In any event, the importance of procedural and evidentiary
differences has already been fully discounted by acceptance of pro hac
vice admission to try a case. Trials are where procedure and evidence
rules do their work. Further, variations in local law are easily located
through electronic research. Even where a jurisdiction can claim that its
rule on a topic is unusual—say, when an anticipatory breach of contract
will excuse performance or the implied obligations of a commercial
lessor to provide a particular service—the difference can be easily
discovered, especially by a lawyer who concentrates in that area of law.
The fact that technology, as earlier discussed, makes the law of nearly
any place available anyplace without need for a brick and mortar law
library, enhances the ability of a specialist to quickly identify
jurisdictional variations in the law of her specialty.
Specialization in legal fields is a complement to the movement
toward conformity of law. It should be self-evident that a UCC expert in
Ohio will know more about the UCC in Indiana than will the products
liability expert in Indiana, who in turn will know more about products
liability in Ohio than will the Ohio criminal defense lawyer. That is to
say, each lawyer will be better able to get up to speed on (be competent
in) the law in the other jurisdiction in her area of specialization than will
the home-state lawyer with a different specialty. Specialists know what
variations to look for, if any. I’m a dilettante in most legal fields but I
know a lot about one field—the law and rules governing the legal
profession. It is, I hope, not arrogance to think that I, a New York lawyer,

2002) (holding that an attorney who was admitted to a federal district court in Michigan but not the
state bar and who had an office in Michigan was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in
Michigan and was entitled to fees from the Michigan bankruptcy court).
182. Deborah Jones Merritt & Ric Simmons, Learning Evidence: From the Federal Rules to
the Courtroom 24 (2009) (“[M]ore than forty states have adopted state codes that are nearly
identical—in language and numbering—to the Federal Rules.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance,
and Erie, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 877, 922 n.181 (2011) (“[A]fter the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, many state courts adopted the Federal Rules nearly in toto, and the basic vision of the
Federal Rules—liberal pleading, broad discovery, generous joinder, and so on—has exercised an
influence even on those states that did not adopt the Rules.”).
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am better able to advise a law firm in Virginia on issues in my field than
are most Virginia lawyers, just as many Virginia lawyers are better able
than am I to advise New Yorkers in other areas of New York law.
Specialization overcompensates for deviations in local law. Of course,
there are Virginia lawyers who are also expert in my field of
concentration. A Virginia lawyer need not reach out to a New Yorker,
but that will not always be true. A client in a small community may be
unable to find a lawyer with a particular specialty in his city and may
desire to consult one in a neighboring state. Or a Richmond law firm may
not want a local lawyer to know too much about its business. Once, a
lawyer’s specialty was defined by the law of the state of admission—that
is to say, by geography. You were a New York lawyer or a Texas lawyer
and your specialty was New York or Texas law, or some part of it. My
claim is that today specialization is increasingly defined by expertise in
areas of law and that this development is marginalizing the utility of
political and geographical boundaries as the exclusive or even the
dominant basis for defining competence.
Beyond homogenization of local law and the leveling influence of
specialization, a third factor diminishing the importance of knowledge of
a particular jurisdiction’s law as a basis for regulation is the nearly
unlimited power of contracting parties to decide what law, if any, will
govern their disputes and in what forum and at what location those
183
disputes will be heard. If the dispute will be heard in a noncourt
tribunal, as with arbitration, the parties can say nothing about the
governing law, designate a particular jurisdiction’s law, authorize the
arbitrator to choose the law, or even direct the arbitrator to rule as she
184
deems fair, which is about as far from our understanding of what law is
as one can get without flipping a coin. An American company
headquartered in Seattle and a German company headquartered in
Frankfurt may contract for a project in China with disputes heard in
arbitration in Singapore under the law of New York or general legal
principles.
E. The Sum of the Parts
We can have law without either lawyers or law firms. On our laptops
or in a “cloud,” we can carry a vast law library and any documents we
may require for our work. Even without a laptop, we can access the same
material from anywhere in the world with an Internet connection and
easily available programs. We can communicate from anyplace with
anyone, anywhere, in text, video, or voice. Our physical location can be

183. 2 Martin Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration §§ 30:1–30:6 (2010).
184. Id. §§ 30:1–30:2; Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d
1, 17 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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hidden from, or in any event not revealed to, anyone, including courts,
clients, adversaries, and regulators. Within modest limits we can agree to
resolve disputes anywhere, before anyone we choose, under any law we
select or no specified law. The law anywhere is growing closer to the law
everywhere else, and federal law, increasingly prominent, is the same
everywhere. The federal government and federal courts can override
local control of law practice. Specialized knowledge will often define the
borders of a lawyer’s competence with greater assurance than will the
geographical borders of his licensing jurisdiction. Lawyers who represent
parties in arbitration are not, in the view of at least three courts,
practicing law even though the arbitrator may be charged to apply the
law of a particular place and her ruling will finally determine the legal
rights of the parties. These things are true and, in ways we cannot fully
predict, will become more pronounced in the years ahead as information
technology becomes still more sophisticated, as national and
international borders recede as impediments to commerce, and as
geographical discrepancies in the cost of legal services and legal support
services encourage the growth of new categories and sources of law
workers and new businesses to house them. The traditional model of
lawyer regulation cannot expect to police this new world. It can pretend
to do so, and on rare occasions it will discover a miscreant and punish her
as an example to others and thereby reaffirm its power and legitimacy in
its own eyes. But it will become less effective than Prohibition-era law
enforcement. Its power is ebbing. What, then, should enlightened
regulators do, not because they legally must but because they should?
In answering that question, one argument must be immediately
repudiated: that if we do anything that recognizes these changes, we
afford a patina of legitimacy at the expense of the American legal
profession’s core values: confidentiality, loyalty, candor, and diligence.
Not only is that claim false, I argue that the opposite is true. Doing
nothing threatens these values because by ignoring the accelerating
changes at play, we fail to regulate against the abuses these changes may
bring, just as any economic activity is capable of causing both good and
ill. To put it another way, the cry we must heed is not for less regulation
of the profession, but rather for new regulation of the burgeoning ways
that legal services are sold. That these changes bring with them new
forms of competition with established distribution channels and the
lawyers who populate them, and that they undoubtedly will lead to
financial disappointment and professional dislocation for many lawyers
while empowering others and offering possible benefits to clients in the
form of lower costs and greater efficiency, seems indisputable. It is not a
trend, I submit, that we can vote down. Indeed, insofar as the changes
make legal services more accessible and affordable while protecting core
values, our social responsibility requires us to welcome them. But if the
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illusion that we can stop the changes leads to inaction, we do threaten the
very core values we claim to protect.

IV. What Should We Do? Eleven Recommendations
for Change (with Qualifications)
Any proposals must address this question: Who will be allowed to
participate in the law business, in what capacity, from where, and with
what protections for clients, the justice system, and the profession’s core
values? The eleven recommendations that follow are offered as a way to
start a conversation. None is inflexible.
185

A. Create a Single Bar Examination with Separate State Scoring

Similarities in much of the law of U.S. jurisdictions make separate
state bar examinations presumptively unnecessary. Indeed, for the
186
reasons discussed, it is far less important to identify knowledge of
particular legal rules, or variations on them, among jurisdictions, than a
knowledge of the legal concepts generally and demonstrated ability to
work through legal and factual problems in a way we understand as
“doing law” or “thinking like a lawyer.” Such knowledge can be tested
without requiring the applicant to know any state’s particular position on
an issue. It is important to be able to identify issues latent in a fact
pattern and to research their resolution under the law of the jurisdiction
whose law applies (as well as to identify which jurisdiction’s law applies).
It tells us nothing useful about an applicant’s qualification for the bar
that she has (temporarily) memorized the particular way the testing
jurisdiction has resolved one or another issue.
This proposal comes with three qualifications. First, different
jurisdictions may wish to set different passing scores for the single bar
examination I support. We know today that different states have
187
different bar passage rates and employ different scoring for multistate
188
examinations now in use. State A may want to set the admission bar
higher than does State B. Below I will recommend national motion
admission—a procedure that will allow a lawyer admitted in any U.S.
jurisdiction to relocate her practice to another U.S. jurisdiction.
However, I will recommend limitations on motion admission. We do not
want to encourage applicants to take the examination in a state with a
lower passing score on a uniform examination and then to seek
immediately to convert their passage into admission in a state with the
185. Whether the examination is called a uniform bar examination or a national bar examination
or something else is unimportant. The National Organization of Bar Counsel has chosen “uniform”
apparently because it is more readily accepted.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 45–55.
187. See Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners, 2009 Statistics (2010).
188. Id.
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higher score they failed to achieve. That would undermine the legitimate
policy of the second state.
The second qualification on this proposal is to entertain the
possibility that a state may have good reasons to test some aspects of its
local law and wish to supplement the national bar examination by testing
local law knowledge. Frankly, I doubt that any state, save perhaps
189
Louisiana, could justify a supplementary examination and I would be
skeptical of any such claim. But I leave open the possibility. While a
supplemental local law examination for new lawyers may be justified, I
argue below that one would not be defensible for lawyers practicing for a
190
stated period of time elsewhere and who wish to relocate.
Last, every jurisdiction would have the right to conduct a character
investigation of any applicant, whether a new lawyer or a relocating one.
B. Permit Lawyers to Physically Relocate Their Practice from One
Jurisdiction to Another Without Retaking the Bar Examination
Lawyers who have been in active practice for a period of years
should be able to relocate their practices to any other U.S. jurisdiction
without need to take a bar examination. This is now the rule in all but
191
eleven U.S. jurisdictions. The ABA Model Motion Admission Rule
envisions a requirement of five years of active practice in the previous
192
seven years. A requirement of three of the last seven years would
accommodate the demands of parenthood, for example, without
threatening the goals of the rules. But whatever the temporal requirement,
I urge the nationalization of this avenue of admission, as has occurred in
193
194
Canada and among nations in the European Union. Lawyers who do
not satisfy the temporal requirement should be permitted to relocate
without taking a further bar examination if their score on the uniform
bar examination is equal to or greater than the passing score for entering
lawyers in the jurisdiction to which they wish to relocate. There would
195
seem to be a strong constitutional claim to be able to do so.
189. Louisiana is “the only U.S. jurisdiction with a predominantly civil law tradition.” Gerald
Korngold, Globalizing Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for International
Environmental Protection, 28 Wis. Int’l L.J. 585, 620 (2011) (discussing the Louisiana Civil Code).
190. See infra text accompanying notes 191–196.
191. See supra note 54.
192. The ABA rule also permits tacking experience and has a generous definition of full time
practice. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Model Rule on Admission by Motion, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ethics2020/aomissuepaper.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
193. See Fed’n of Law Societies of Can., National Mobility Agreement (2002), available at
http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/becoming/mobility_agreement_aug02[1].pdf.
194. The EU rule applies across nations with different legal systems, not merely within a single
nation. See Christine R. Davis, Approaching Reform: The Future of Multijurisdictional Practice in
Today’s Legal Profession, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1339, 1357–59 (2002).
195. See Perlman, supra note 12, at 159.

Gillers_22 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete)

May 2012]

A PROFESSION, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT

4/19/2012 6:17 PM

1001

A further examination of the relocating lawyer would be defensible
in two circumstances: if the lawyer’s scores on the uniform examination
were lower than the new jurisdiction then demanded of new applicants,
unless the lawyer satisfies the temporal requirements; or in the unlikely
event that the new jurisdiction can justify supplementing the uniform
examination with one testing local law for all applicants, as described
196
earlier.
C. Permit a Lawyer Admitted in any U.S. Jurisdiction to Practice
Virtually in any Other Jurisdiction Within the Scope of Her
Competence
A dramatic consequence of the Internet is that law firms (like other
businesses) can as a practical matter sell their services nationwide
without leaving home. Virtual presence can be as or nearly as intrusive
on a host jurisdiction as physical presence, which is to say that, from afar,
a lawyer in any state can have a vibrant practice in any other state for
certain kinds of work. Lawyers in cities near or on the border with an
adjacent state are especially positioned to practice this way because if the
need arises to consult with their clients in person, they can travel to the
client or (if especially cautious) ask the client to come to them. Kansas
City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri, are prime examples. Others
include Philadelphia, Boston, New York, Memphis, Portland, Omaha,
Chicago, Fargo, and Washington, D.C. Where the need for in-person
consultation is absent or limited, a lawyer’s virtual practice can be
national. Advertising on the Internet, which is cheap and ubiquitous,
facilitates this business model for lawyers who can credibly claim a
particular expertise that will appeal to clients elsewhere. Nor can we
expect easily to be able to enforce rules forbidding attorney-client
relationships in cyberspace. This is consensual activity often impelled by
rational considerations on both sides. Unless lawyer and client have a
falling out and the client wants to assert a claim of unauthorized practice
to gain leverage in a fee dispute, the practice will defy detection. The
Internet invites a market defined by reputation, price, and competence,
not geography. A virtual market also undercuts the ability of states to
use physical location as the basis for control.
I suggest that lawyers should be allowed to form attorney-client
197
First, by
relationships on the Internet, subject to qualifications.
entering a jurisdiction virtually, including through representation or
solicitation of the jurisdiction’s residents, a lawyer will subject herself to
the disciplinary and judicial authority of the jurisdiction for claims arising

196. See supra text accompanying notes 53–55.
197. It is easier to accept this proposal once we have accepted the recommendation for generous
motion admission described above. See supra notes 191–96.
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198

out of the lawyer’s virtual presence there. She may be deemed to have
appointed an appropriate state officer as her agent for service of process.
Second, the lawyer’s home state should commit itself to accept any
factual findings, legal (or ethical) conclusions, and sanctions imposed by
the host state’s disciplinary authorities, subject only to the usual
limitations on full faith and credit owed judicial judgments of a sister
199
state. In this way, a lawyer cannot misbehave, confident that she can
avoid a home-state sanction for her conduct. Third, any lawyer entering a
host jurisdiction virtually must identify her jurisdictional limitations
(“member of the bar of State A only”) and the name and address of the
regulatory authority in her home state to which complaints can be
directed.
Finally, most challenging is the situation where the virtual presence
is not casual and episodic but rather continuous and substantial, whether
or not by design. I have in mind the possibility that a lawyer in State A
will seek to expand her practice to attract clients in neighboring State B
through advertising and solicitations aimed specifically at them. Or
without intending it, a State A lawyer’s virtual practice may become
significantly populated with State B clients. Virtual presence can, past a
point, be the functional equivalent of physical presence. We should not
allow a lawyer physically to open a law practice in State B without formal
200
admission of some kind. When the lawyer’s virtual practice in State B
can be said, whether by design or happenstance, to equal physical
201
presence, we should also require admission. Of course, like much in
law, the question will turn on degree.

198. This is already anticipated in Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5 cmt. 4 (2010) and in
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(a). I address solicitation and advertising infra text
accompanying notes 202–204.
199. The current ABA recommendation envisions something close to this regime, but has
exceptions that should be narrowed. See Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement R.22
(2002). The host state cannot, of course, suspend or disbar the lawyer, but it can find that the same
conduct would warrant either sanction if the lawyer were admitted in the host state, and such a finding
should be recognized in the home state. The concern that out-of-state lawyers might meet harsher
sanctions than in-state lawyers, a surmise at best, can be addressed in a defense to home-state
enforcement.
200. It can be full admission by motion or after passing required examinations, or it can be
admission through state B’s in-house counsel rule. An in-house counsel rule allows an out-of-state
lawyer to practice law from an office location within a state without having to gain admission to the
state’s bar, but limits the lawyer to work for her organizational employer and its affiliated companies
and does not entitle the lawyer to appear in court. See, e.g., N.Y. Ct. App R. 522.1–522.7.
201. A lawyer who could gain permanent admission in State B through motion admission might
prefer not to do so to avoid bar dues or State B’s (possibly more demanding) CLE requirements. State
B might also require lawyers admitted to its bar to have an office in the state, as some states already
require, see infra text accompanying note 205, and the lawyer may not wish to open a second office. I
suggest below that an office requirement as a condition of motion admission has little value. See infra
text accompanying note 205.
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D. To Accommodate Cross-Border Legal Advertising, Create a
Uniform Rule Identifying Minimum Standards and Disclosure
Requirements
202

The advertising rules in U.S. jurisdictions are greatly dissimilar.
The need for uniformity in advertising rules is underscored by the
national reach of legal ads, especially but not only on the Internet. It is
neither practical nor necessary to require legal ads to conform to all state
variations. The answer may be different for a solicitation targeted at
specific potential clients. State rules can require that solicitations of state
residents respect the state’s solicitation rules, thereby treating out-ofstate and in-state lawyers equally. So a rule that imposes a waiting period
before contact with a prospective client with a personal injury claim
203
would apply to all lawyers. But advertisements, on the other hand, are
not targeted, they are generic.
A uniform rule for cross-border legal advertisements should require,
in addition to appropriate disclaimers and a prohibition against false or
misleading statements, that such advertisements contain the name and
contact information of the lawyer or firm responsible for the
advertisement, the name and location of the advertiser’s regulatory
authority, and the jurisdictional limitations of the advertiser, if an
individual. If the advertiser is a law firm, its ad should identify the
204
jurisdictions in which its lawyers are admitted. If states are unable to
agree on a uniform rule, then the rule should be that an advertisement
satisfies the rules in any jurisdiction if it satisfies the rules in the
jurisdiction in which the advertising lawyer or firm practices.
E. Permit Motion Admission Without Requiring an Office or
Minimum Practice in the New Jurisdiction
Today, a state may condition the privilege of motion admission (and
the ability to bypass the bar examination) on a requirement that the
lawyer have an office in the state or the expectation that she will spend a
205
certain amount of time representing clients in the state. It is doubtful
that states scrupulously monitor their admitted lawyers to ensure that
they continue to meet any office or practice requirements. Even
assuming that states have power to impose a practice or office requirement

202. For variations in Rules 7.1 through 7.3, see the annotations to these rules in Stephen Gillers
et al., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 418–56 (2011).
203. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
204. I draw here on Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.1 (2010).
205. Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court, 38 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 1995); Goldfarb v. Supreme
Court, 766 F.2d 859, 865 (4th Cir. 1985). But see Schoenefeld v. New York, No. 1:09–CV–00504,
2011 WL 3957282, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2011) (holding that under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the state could not require a nonresident New York lawyer to have an office in New York
when the state did not require the same of New York residents).
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as a condition of admission or continued admission, doing so makes little
sense today. The fear that lawyers will collect bar admissions like
trophies if they are liberated from practice and office requirements is
unrealistic. They will have to pay bar or court dues in every state in
which they are admitted and may be subject to other requirements, such
as continuing legal education (“CLE”) requirements different or more
demanding than those in their home jurisdictions, contributions to a
client protection fund, and availability for court appointments. An office
or practice requirement is an impediment to bar admission without
corresponding benefit to the state. Lawyers are most likely to seek
motion admission in neighboring states because they can realistically
hope to serve clients from those states. Their offices may be closer to
those clients than are those of lawyers in distant parts of the neighboring
state. A northern New Jersey lawyer, for example, may wish to satisfy
the New York motion admission rule. She is closer to New York City
than are many lawyers located in New York State.
F.

Require Lawyers to Have Malpractice Insurance

Requiring malpractice insurance should be simple, but the
resistance is likely to be intense, which is itself odd—if not
disingenuous—if easier national practice proposals are opposed on the
ground that they subject clients to incompetent out-of-state lawyers.
206
Only Oregon now mandates malpractice insurance. Few if any rules
could protect clients as effectively as a rule requiring malpractice
insurance, which at least would ensure payment of malpractice
judgments up to the limit of the lawyer’s policy and compliance with the
preventive measures that insurance carriers require. One objection likely
will be that the cost of mandatory malpractice insurance will be passed
on to clients but, if true, this also means that those lawyers who do not
now have such insurance enjoy a market advantage. Their clients may
not even know about the lack of insurance and most states do not require
207
lawyers to tell them.

206. Only Oregon mandates legal malpractice insurance, administered through the state bar. See
Elizabeth Chambliss & David Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Firms: A
Call for Research and Reporting, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 691, 710 & n.106 (2002).
207. According to the ABA, seven states require notice of malpractice coverage, if any, directly to
clients, and eighteen states require lawyers to record this information on their annual registration
statement. Of course, it will be the rare client who looks for the registration statement. ABA
Standing Comm. on Client Protection, State Implementation of ABA Model Court Rule on
Insurance Disclosure (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
2011_build/professional_responsibility/malprac_disc_chart.authcheckdam.pdf.
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G. Create a Presumption That Unless Lawyer and Client Agree
Otherwise, the Conflict Rules of the Jurisdiction in Which the
Client Resides (or Does Business) Govern the Client’s
Relationship with Counsel
Model Rule 8.5 is the choice-of-law provision and purports to tell us
which jurisdiction’s ethical rules govern in the event that a matter
concerns more than one jurisdiction and their rules are inconsistent on a
208
particular issue. The choice-of-rule question can and does arise today
regardless of the lawyer’s home jurisdiction, even if it is the same as the
209
client’s. This is because a matter may require work in two or more
jurisdictions. A jurisdiction’s rules are meant to govern the behavior of
lawyers who practice in it, whether they belong to its bar or are present
210
temporarily.
Because my proposals likely will increase the frequency with which
a client and lawyer reside and work in different places, I support a weak
presumption that the client’s home-state conflict rules govern the
lawyer’s conduct (unless the matter is in litigation, where the tribunal’s
rules will always govern, although the tribunal may itself face the need to
elect from competing rules). I limit this presumption to conflict rules,
whose purpose is protection of clients. There would be no presumption
when a rule is meant to protect third parties because then the jurisdiction
in which the lawyer provides services will have an interest in the
governing rule. Duties to a tribunal and duties to correct false statements
in negotiation are examples of situations that implicate the interests of
211
third parties.
I am encouraged to propose this weak presumption because the
lawyer and client can choose to replace it with the client’s informed
212
consent. Rule 8.5(b) can go only so far in enabling the parties to predict

208. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b) (2010) provides:
Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of
professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the
jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct
occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules
of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to
discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer
reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.
(emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5(a) gives a jurisdiction disciplinary authority over
lawyers who are not admitted to its bar. Rule 8.5(b) guides the choice of rule. Rule 5.5(c) permits
temporary practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not admitted.
211. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3–4.1 (2010).
212. Model Rules 1.7(b), 1.9(a), and 1.10(d) allow informed consent to displace their provisions,
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which jurisdiction’s rules will govern particular conduct in a
representation in the event of a dispute. Unavoidably, the rule states a
standard, not a bright line. The consent provisions of the conflict rules
permit lawyer and client to reduce the uncertainty that a standard
necessarily creates.
I suggest further that the parties should be able to substitute not
merely one rule for another, but all of the conflict rules of another
jurisdiction by name. For example, they should be able to say that “Rules
1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct will govern
this matter.” The value of doing this is even greater predictability and
less uncertainty. They are importing not only the text of the Illinois rules
but also the case law’s interpretation of them. Of course, any such
agreement must have the client’s informed consent, confirmed in writing
as Model Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 now require to displace their provisions.
Further, the designated jurisdiction should have a connection to the
representation. That connection can be that the jurisdiction is where a
substantial amount of work is reasonably expected to occur or that,
drawing on the test in Model Rule 8.5(b), it is where the “predominant
effect” of the representation is likely to be. The designated jurisdiction
will often, therefore, be one that a lawyer reasonably could have
identified under Rule 8.5(b) if she were later confronted with different
rules from two or more jurisdictions whose rules might apply.
H. Require Internet Providers of Legal Products to Include
Appropriate Disclosures and Disclaimers Prominently
Throughout Their Websites, Promotional Materials, and
Advertising
When the Texas legislature amended its unauthorized practice law
213
in response to the court decision finding that Quicken Family Lawyer
violated the unauthorized practice law, it specified that the “computer
software, or similar products” that it was exempting from the law’s reach
had to “clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a
214
substitute for the advice of an attorney.” I recommend that, in addition
to this disclaimer, these websites must contain the following:
 If any lawyers have participated in the creation of the program or
its contents, their names, business addresses, and bar status and bar
numbers must be posted on the website;
 If no lawyers participated in the content or creation of the
program, that must be stated;

with two exceptions. A law firm cannot represent competing claims in the same matter before a
tribunal. Id. R. 1.7(b)(3). Nor may the parties consent to a representation that is “prohibited by law.”
Id. R. 1.7(b)(2).
213. See supra text accompanying note 120.
214. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.101(c) (West 2011).
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 The program must say that the organization selling the product is
not a law firm and that the ethical duties lawyers have to clients
might not apply to the transaction between the buyer and seller of
the product; and
 The organization should be required to file with an appropriate
agency wherever it offers its services or products the location of its
principal place of business and the names and addresses of its
senior officers, with the fact and location of this filing revealed on
the organization’s website.

The goal here is twofold: First, to make the provenance of the
product clear to the consumer so that there is no ambiguity about the
nature of the organization with which she is dealing, and second, to
provide the consumer with the identities of those who may have
responsibility for the product in the event the consumer believes she may
have a claim. This is especially important for the lawyers behind the
product, whose identities might otherwise be difficult to discover.
Requiring the lawyers to put their names on the product—to accept
responsibility for it—encourages a level of care that might otherwise be
lost.
I would not allow the seller to disclaim or limit liability as a
condition of the purchase. This position is consistent with ethics rules
that forbid lawyers to bargain with a client for exemptions from
prospective malpractice liability unless the client is independently
215
represented in the matter. Users of programs that dispense legal
216
documents will not, of course, be independently represented.
Publishers of books containing legal advice do sometimes include a
disclaimer of accuracy (“every effort has been made”), but online
services offering legal documents should not enjoy the same option.
Unlike a book buyer, who knows he is but one of many equally
positioned buyers, the Internet customer is encouraged to believe that
the document created by the program is tailored to his particular goals,
which are identified by his responses to a series of focused questions.
I.

Permit Nonlawyers to Have Equity Interests and Management
217
Authority in For-Profit Law Firms

Nonlawyers may manage and participate in law firm income in
many ways. Today, for example, a law firm may include a nonlawyer in
the firm’s “compensation or retirement plan even though the plan is

215. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.8(h) (2010).
216. I realize that some users of these services may be lawyers who wish to generate documents for
their own clients. In representing their clients, with a client’s informed consent, an agreement limiting
the seller’s liability will satisfy Rule 1.8(h). Id.
217. Under current rules and constitutional doctrine, nonlawyers may manage nonprofit
organizations that offer legal services. Id. R. 5.4 (2010); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29
(1963).
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based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.” This would
seem to allow compensation tied entirely to the firm’s net profits as
determined at year’s end. Not allowed is compensation tied to fees in
particular matters. Nonlawyers may be managers of a law firm so long as
219
they are not partners and do not have “the right to direct or control the
220
professional judgment of a lawyer.”
Allowing nonlawyers to share in legal fees other than through a
compensation plan based on profit sharing, or to be partners in law firms,
or to have an ownership or directorial interest in a professional
corporation or association would require significant rule changes. The
changes could take one of several shapes. One change would allow
221
nonlawyer partners but add a cap on their percentage interest and
impose certain other requirements discussed next. A second change
would allow the same but without limit on their equity participation so
long as the entity solely practices law. The latter has been the rule in the
District of Columbia, the only U.S. jurisdiction to permit nonlawyer
222
partners and owners, since 1991. It has caused no problems according
223
to D.C. Bar counsel. A more dramatic change would allow a business
organization to own a law firm. Wal-Mart could place one in its stores
alongside other service providers, like pharmacists and opticians. An
even greater change would allow law firms to go public and sell shares on
224
a stock exchange, as is now permitted in Australia.
An important distinction is needed here. What I propose, and what
the Washington, D.C. rules allow, is to permit nonlawyers who are
actively engaged in a law firm’s work to participate in ownership of the
firm. But the firm must be a law firm, which means it is a singledisciplinary, not a multidisciplinary, entity. In 2000, the ABA emphatically
rejected a proposal to permit lawyers and nonlawyers to combine in

218. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4(a)(3) (2010) (emphasis added).
219. Id. R. 5.4(b).
220. Id. R. 5.4(d)(3).
221. I will use the term “partners” to refer to all arrangements in which nonlawyers have an
ownership interest in a for-profit law firm, including in professional corporations and associations.
222. See D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2007), which permits a nonlawyer (without limit
on number) to have a “financial interest” in a law firm if the nonlawyer “performs professional
services which assist the [firm] in providing legal services to clients”—that is, is not a passive
investor—so long as the nonlawyer agrees to “abide by [the D.C.] Rules of Professional Conduct” and
the lawyers in the firm “undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent
as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1.” Rule 5.1 describes the responsibility of firm
partners to supervise the firm’s lawyers. Id. R. 5.1.
223. Joan C. Rogers, Trio of Federal Suits Challenge Ethics Rule That Stops Private Equity
Investment in Firms, 27 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 382, 383 (2011). This may be, however, because
few firms have taken advantage of the authority because of problems that would arise for their lawyers
in other jurisdictions.
224. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should Promote
Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 577, 628 (2011).
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organizations that offer both legal and other services. The rejected
proposal provided that lawyers should be permitted to share fees and
join with nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal
and nonlegal professional services (multidisciplinary practice), provided
that the lawyers have the control and authority necessary to assure
lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services. “Nonlawyer
professionals” means members of recognized professions or other
225
disciplines that are governed by ethical standards.
Instead, the ABA adopted the following resolution:
[E]ach jurisdiction is urged to revise its law governing lawyers to
implement the following principles and preserve the core values of the
legal profession:

....
6. Jurisdictions should retain and enforce laws that generally bar the
practice of law by entities other than law firms.
7. The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership and
control of the practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent with the
226
core values of the legal profession.
8. The law governing lawyers, that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal
fees with nonlawyers and from directly or indirectly transferring to
nonlawyers ownership or control over entities practicing law, should
227
not be revised.

In 2000, therefore, the ABA not only opposed multidisciplinary
practice, it went further and opposed nonlawyer ownership in law firms
that offer legal services only—that is, that were not multidisciplinary—
and also opposed sharing legal fees between lawyers and nonlawyers.
Allowing nonlawyers to participate in the legal industry in either of these
ways was seen as posing an unacceptable threat to the core values of the

225. DC Bar, Report & Recommendation of the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on
Multidisciplinary Practice, http://www.dcbar.org/inside_the_bar/structure/reports/special_committee_on_
multidisciplinary_practice/background.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012); see John Eligon, Selling Pieces
of Law Firms, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2011, at B1.
226. The ABA defined the core values as follows:
(a) the lawyer’s duty of undivided loyalty to the client;
(b) the lawyer’s duty competently to exercise independent legal judgment for the benefit of
the client;
(c) the lawyer’s duty to hold client confidences inviolate;
(d) the lawyer’s duty to avoid conflicts of interest with the client; and
(e) the lawyer’s duty to help maintain a single profession of law with responsibilities as a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.
(f) The lawyer’s duty to promote access to justice.
MDP Recommendation—Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdprecom10f.html (last visited
Mar. 17, 2012).
227. Id.
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profession. That perception did not depend on evidence; Washington,
228
D.C.’s experience with its version of Model Rule 5.4 was not influential.
The prediction of harm was intuitive. The risk was deemed too great to
take a chance. It is doubtful whether any empirical evidence could have
229
made a difference.
Allowing nonlawyers to become partners (or have equity interests)
in law firms has obvious benefits. It will make it easier for a firm to
attract talented professionals who wish to have a vote in the management
and share in the profits of their businesses on a par with lawyers and for
whom status as an employee, even a well-compensated one, is deemed
inadequate recognition of their talents. With other accomplished
professionals on board, a firm can more easily provide services ancillary
to legal services (called “law-related services”), as Model Rule 5.7
permits—for example, a financial advisor can contribute to the work of a
firm that offers estate planning advice, an environmental scientist or
architect can aid the law clients of a construction law firm, a licensed
investigator can prove valuable to a criminal defense firm, and a doctor
or nurse may benefit a medical malpractice firm. But even granting these
advantages, what can be done to ensure that the presence of nonlawyers
as owners and managers does not threaten the core values of the
profession that the ABA identified in 2000? What can give us comfort
that the nonlawyers will not lead lawyers astray?
Many might argue that no comfort is necessary because the
premise—that the nonlawyers will seek to undermine the core values and
that lawyers will either succumb or stand quietly by—is wrong, even
insulting, to all concerned. Lawyers have no right to assume, they may
argue, that the presence of others poses a threat to legal clients. Lawyers
have no basis to claim moral superiority as a categorical matter. As it
happens, we do not have to take sides in this contest, let alone
empirically test the competing arguments, assuming that it would even be
possible to do so. We should be able to reduce the risk of nonlawyer
imposition sufficiently to enable us modestly to allow others into the
legal services market.
As of March 2009, England and Wales have allowed what are called
Legal Disciplinary Practices (“LDPs”). Solicitors, barristers, notaries,
conveyancers, and others, including certain foreign lawyers and
nonlawyers, may combine in an LDP. Nonlawyers must be found
“suitable” by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which can also withdraw
230
approval. Nonlawyer ownership of a firm is capped at twenty-five
228. See supra text accompanying note 222.
229. Later reporting on Arthur Andersen’s participation in the collapse of Enron could be seen to
vindicate that worry. See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, Who’s Keeping the Accountants
Accountable?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2002, at C1.
230. Solicitor’s Regulation Auth. Recognized Bodies Reg. 5 (2010) (U.K.).
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percent. An LDP can practice only law. Passive investors are not
231
allowed. By 2012, the U.K. anticipates that it will go further and allow
232
what has come to be known as Alternate Business Structures (“ABS”).
An ABS may have passive investors (sometimes called Tesco law in the
expectation that retailers will create law firms to provide routine services
to consumers). Shares in an ABS can be publicly traded. An ABS can
offer multidisciplinary services, not just legal services. Once the ABS
structure is approved, there will be no further need for a separate LDP
233
category.
I do not recommend that regulation of the American bar copy the
U.K. innovations unchanged (or at this stage perhaps we should say the
U.K. experiment). But I do think that the LDP structure in the U.K.
coupled with the safeguards in the Washington, D.C. version of Model
Rule 5.4 have something to teach us about how to reduce the risk that
nonlawyer managers or owners of law firms will tempt (or order) lawyers
to misbehave. Risk can be adequately eliminated, insofar as risk can ever
be eliminated, if:
 Nonlawyer participation is limited as in the U.K. to twenty-five
percent;
 The law firm limits its services to legal and law-related services;
 An appropriate regulatory body is authorized to approve
nonlawyer owners as suitable to participate in the law industry
(much as character committees approve new lawyers);
 The regulatory body can also remove this approval for misconduct
(the equivalent of disbarment);
 The nonlawyer owners commit themselves to compliance with the
jurisdiction’s ethical rules for lawyers and take a mandatory course
in those rules, refreshed periodically just as states may require
lawyers to have CLE credits in legal ethics annually;
 The lawyer owners take responsibility to supervise this compliance;
 The legal and ethical rules governing the profession of the
nonlawyer owners do not require or forbid conduct contrary to the
commandments of the law and ethics governing lawyers; and
 Nonlawyers cannot direct the work of lawyers.

231. Solicitor’s Regulation Auth. Code of Conduct R. 12.01 (2007) (U.K.); see also Legal
Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.).
232. Sofia Lind, Alternative Business Structure Launched Under U.K. Legal Services Act, Legal
Week (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202518170381.
233. Movement toward authority for ABS is continuing, but the timetable is dependent on various
approvals. The best way to stay abreast of developments is at the website of the Solicitors Regulation
Authority. These two pages, with internal hyperlinks, will be helpful. FAQs: Legal Services Act and
ABSs, Solicitors Regulation Auth., http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/legal-services-act/faqs/ABS-faqs.page
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012); Alternative Business Structures, Solicitors Regulation Auth.,
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/freedom-in-practice/alternative-business-structures.page (last visited Mar.
17, 2012). The latter page envisioned ABS authority by the end of 2011.
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This is not to say that these precautions are an insurance policy or
warranty against bad behavior, but neither do we enjoy equivalent
assurances today from the bar. Whoever populates the business of law,
234
there will never be guarantees.
J.

Ease Temporary and Permanent Admission to Practice in the
United States for Applicants with Foreign Law Degrees

U.S. jurisdictions vary greatly in their willingness to allow foreigntrained law graduates, including lawyers admitted abroad, to work in the
United States either temporarily or permanently, and if permanently, in
the scope of the authority allowed them. Efforts should be made to
harmonize the rules and liberalize them.
1. Current Rules: Regular Admission of Foreign Lawyers and Law
Graduates
I consider first rules in New York and California, which are far and
away the most generous in permitting foreign-trained lawyers and law
graduates to sit for their bar examinations. I then look at a few other
states.
The New York Court of Appeals rule on allowing foreign-educated
235
lawyers to take the New York bar examination is section 520.6. It is
compactly worded and next to impossible to unravel. It recognizes three
categories for admission. Only those applicants falling within the first
category qualify to take the New York bar without further graduate law
study.
The first category encompasses graduates of law schools in countries
whose jurisprudence is “based upon the principles of English Common
236
Law.” These graduates may take the New York State bar examination
if the “period of law study” meets the same “durational” requirements
imposed on U.S. law graduates, and if the “program and course of study”
is “the substantial equivalent” of what is required by an “approved” U.S.
237
law school. So a graduate of Oxford who studied law for as long as New
York State requires for a U.S. law student, and whose curriculum is the
“substantial equivalent” of what is required in the United States, may
take the bar examination without more. She need not be a member of

234. Advances in information technology to some extent make moot the ABA’s decision about
whether to continue to fence others out. “The question used to be: ‘Will the ABA change Rule 5.4?,’”
University of Illinois Law Professor Larry Ribstein asked rhetorically as reported in the ABA Journal.
“The question now is, ‘Who cares?’” was his reply. Barbara Rose, Law, the Investment, ABA J.,
Sept. 1, 2010, at 44.
235. N.Y. Ct. App. R. 520.6 (2012). The description here is to Rule 520.6 as amended on April 27,
2011, which becomes effective as of the July 2013 bar examination.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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any bar or ever have visited the United States or taken classes at a U.S.
law school.
If the applicant does not meet the durational requirement for U.S.
law study but has “at least two years of substantially equivalent
education,” meaning in a common-law school, or if the applicant meets
the durational requirement for U.S. law study but does not have a
“substantially equivalent education,” then she may take the New York
238
bar examination if she earns an LL.M. degree. But if the candidate
lacks both the durational and the substantive requirements, the
additional study will not compensate. The additional study must occur in
239
the United States.
The final category encompasses those law graduates who are
already admitted to practice in a country “whose jurisprudence is based
upon principles of English Common Law” and whose “admission was
240
based upon a program of study in a law school and/or law office.” The
differences between this category and the prior categories are the
recognition of law office study and the requirement of admission to the
bar of a common-law country. If, then, the applicant’s study is
“durationally equivalent” under New York’s rules for U.S. law
graduates, but not “substantially equivalent” to the course of study in a
U.S. law school, she can compensate for the lack of the substantial
equivalence through the same further study set forth for category two,
241
with the same conditions and limitations. The legislative history for
category three explains that it is meant specifically to benefit solicitors in
the U.K. whose legal education includes both classroom study and an
242
“articled clerkship.”
For the first two routes to admission, the respective rule requires
that the candidate’s school have been “recognized by the competent
accrediting agency of the government of such other country, or of a
243
political subdivision thereof” during the candidate’s course of study. In
2010, 77% of applicants to the New York bar who were graduates of an

238. Id. R. 520.6(b)(1)(ii).
239. The LL.M. must include twenty-four credit hours. Two of those credits must be in the history,
rules, values, instructions, responsibilities, and goals of the American legal profession (in other words,
a legal ethics course); two must be in legal research, analysis, and writing; two must be in a course
“designed to introduce students to distinctive aspects and/or fundamental principles of United States
law,” such as civil procedure or constitutional law; and six other credits must be in subjects on the New
York bar examination. Some of these requirements can be combined. Id. R. 520.6(b)(3)(iv)–(vi).
240. Id. R. 520.6(b)(2).
241. Id.
242. The legislative history of the rule is helpfully explained by its drafters. See Howard A. Levine
& Hope B. Engel, New York’s Revised Attorney Admission Rules: Still Rigorous but More “User
Friendly,” Bar Examiner, Aug. 1998, at 42. Howard Levine was then a judge on the New York Court
of Appeals. Id. at 43.
243. N.Y. Ct. App. R. 5.26(b).
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ABA-approved law school passed the examination. The passing rate
245
for foreign law graduates was 34%. New York had 4596 foreign law
246
graduate applicants.
California’s rules also are permissive but not in the same way. So it
is possible that an applicant may qualify to take the examination in
California but not New York, or vice versa. A graduate of a foreign law
school may qualify to take the California bar if she has an additional year
of study in a U.S. law school (leading to an LL.M. degree requiring at
least twenty credits or on completion of twenty credits even without a
247
degree). The applicant’s undergraduate degree must either satisfy the
educational requirements for admission to the bar in the country in
which the school is located or the undergraduate education must be
“substantially equivalent” to the requirements for a J.D. degree from an
ABA-accredited school or a school accredited by the California State
248
Bar’s Committee of Bar Examiners. The subsequent U.S. law school
study need not occur in the United States but must include at least four
courses tested on the California bar examination, and one of those
courses must be a professional responsibility course that covers sections
of the California Rules of Professional Conduct and sections of the
249
California Business and Professions Code.
California’s rules are especially generous if the applicant is a
member of a bar anywhere in the world and regardless of education.
That applicant may take the state bar examination with no further
250
educational requirement. In 2010, 60% of applicants to the California
bar who were graduates of an ABA-approved law school passed the
251
252
examination. The passing rate for foreign law graduates was 13%.
The state had 724 foreign law graduate applicants, the second largest of
253
any U.S. jurisdiction.
Other U.S. jurisdictions get a trickle of foreign-educated applicants
and vary in their requirements for admission. Here are the requirements
and passage rates of those with at least 15 applicants in 2010.
Tennessee: The applicant must have graduated from a law school
“recognized and approved by the competent accrediting agency” of a

244. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. State Bar of Cal., Guidelines for Implementation of Chapter 2, Rule 4.30 of the
Admissions Rules, Guideline 1.2(A)–(B) (2009).
248. Id. Guideline 1.1(A)–(B).
249. Id. Guideline 1.2(A)–(B).
250. Cal. State Bar R. 4.30(B).
251. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 10.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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country; must “satisfy the Board that his or her undergraduate
education and legal education were substantially equivalent to the
255
requirements” for U.S. law graduates; and must complete twenty-four
credits “in residence at a law school approved by the [ABA] or [have]
successfully earned one-third of the credits necessary to graduate from a
256
law school approved by the Board.” In 2010, 79% of graduates from
257
ABA-accredited law schools passed the Tennessee bar examination. Of
the 123 foreign-educated students who took the examination, 28%
258
passed.
District of Columbia: Graduates of non-ABA law schools must
complete twenty-six semester hours of study in an ABA law school in
259
subjects tested on the D.C. bar examination. In 2010, 47% of graduates
260
from ABA-accredited law schools passed the D.C. bar examination. Of
261
the 76 foreign-educated students who took the examination, 18% passed.
Louisiana: An applicant’s legal education must be “equivalent to
that of the legal education offered in the United States . . . by a law
school accredited by the [ABA]. The [ABA’s] standards . . . shall be
262
relevant to any equivalency determination.” The applicant must also
complete “a minimum of fourteen semester hours of credit, or the
equivalent, in professional law subjects from an American law school”
but not more than four credits can be in any one subject. In 2010, 62% of
graduates from ABA-accredited law schools passed the Louisiana bar
263
examination. Of the 40 foreign-educated students who took the
264
examination, 15% passed.
Illinois: Applicants must have practiced law five out of the previous
seven years. The board must determine that the
quality of the applicant’s preliminary, college and legal education is
acceptable based on [among other things] the jurisprudence of the
country . . . the curriculum of the law schools attended and the course
of studies pursued . . . accreditation of the law schools attended . . . by
competent accrediting authorities in the foreign country . . . [and] post265
graduate studies and degrees earned [abroad and in the US] . . . .

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 7, art. 7.
Id.
Id.
2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11.
Id.
D.C. Cir. R. 46(b)(4).
2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11.
Id.
La. Sup. Ct. R. XVII, § 6(B).
2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11.
Id.
Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 715.
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In 2010, 84% of graduates from an ABA-accredited law school passed
266
the Illinois bar examination. Of the 24 foreign-educated students who
267
took the examination, 17% passed.
Texas: Applicants must have completed three years of study at a
foreign law school “accredited in the jurisdiction where it exists” leading
268
to the equivalent of a J.D. degree. The applicant must also have been
engaged in active practice for five out of the previous seven years and
either have an LL.M. from an ABA-accredited school or “demonstrat[e]
to the Board that the law of such foreign nation is sufficiently
comparable to the law of Texas that, in the judgment of the Board, it
enables the foreign attorney to become a competent attorney in Texas
269
without additional formal legal education.” If the applicant’s practice is
only three out of five years, she must both make this demonstration and
270
have an LL.M. from an ABA-accredited school. In 2010, 76% of
graduates from an ABA-accredited law school passed the Texas bar
271
examination. Of the 15 foreign-educated students who took the
272
examination, 33% passed.
Massachusetts: Foreign law graduates may qualify to take the state
bar examination with “a prior determination of their education from the
273
Board of Bar Examiners.” In 2010, 85% of graduates from an ABA274
accredited law school passed the Massachusetts bar examination. Of
the 22 foreign-educated students who took the examination, 50%
275
passed.
2. Current Rules: Other Forms of Authorized Presence for Foreign
Lawyers
The patchwork of rules that enable foreign lawyers to work in the
United States without traditional bar admission defies easy description.
One of the three most important rules is the Foreign Legal Consultant
(“FLC”) rule, which allows lawyers admitted in other countries to
practice permanently in the United States but does not permit them to
276
277
advise on U.S. law. They may be partners in U.S. law firms. An FLC

266. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11.
267. Id.
268. Tex. Bd. of Law Exam’rs R. XIII(b).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11.
272. Id.
273. Mass. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs R. VI.1.
274. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11.
275. Id.
276. Model Rules for the Licensing and Practice of Foreign Legal Consultants § 9 (2010).
Not everyone admitted abroad is a “lawyer” for purposes of the FLC rule. The model FLC rule
defines a “lawyer” as an individual who is, and for at least five years has been, a member in good
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rule, based on the ABA model rule, has been adopted in thirty-one
278
states.
Less prominent are house counsel rules that include foreign lawyers.
A house counsel admission rule offers a separate admission category for
lawyers who are employed by their (usually corporate or organizational)
client and who will represent only that client or its organizational
279
affiliates. The house counsel rule enables a lawyer transferred to a new
state to practice in the new state without having to get admitted to its
bar, either by examination or, if recognized, on motion. The authority to
practice in the new state ends if and when the lawyer leaves her job,
unless she takes a qualifying new one. House counsel rules have been
adopted in thirty-four states and are generally based on a model ABA
280
rule. However, the ABA model rule and the house counsel rule in most
states that have adopted one require that the lawyer be admitted to a
281
U.S. jurisdiction’s bar. Only six states include foreign-admitted lawyers
282
in their house-counsel rule.
The third rule that allows foreign lawyers to enter the United States
is the counterpart to the multijurisdictional practice (“MJP”) rule for
domestic lawyers who temporarily cross state borders in connection with
283
their work. The ABA adopted such a rule at the same time that it
adopted the MJP rule in the Model Rules, but it adopted the foreign
MJP rule as a proposed court rule, not as an amendment to the Model
284
Rules. Perhaps for this reason, when states adopted the MJP rules for
domestic lawyers through amendment of Model Rule 5.5, the
recommendation for foreign lawyer MJP was not before them. Only
285
seven states have extended their MJP rules to foreign lawyers.

standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign country, the members of which are admitted to
practice as lawyers or counselors at law or the equivalent and are subject to effective regulation and
discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority. Id. § 1.
277. Id. § 5(b)(i)(B).
278. ABA, Foreign Legal Consultant Rules (2010).
279. ABA Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Report to the House of
Delegates (2006).
280. Id.; ABA, In-House Corporate Counsel Registration Rules (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/in_house_rules.authcheckdam.pdf.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. ABA Comm’n on Multijurisdictional Practice, Report 201J (2002), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/201j.authcheckdam.pdf. The scope of
practice of the MJP rule for foreign lawyers differs slightly to make it clear that their orbit of
temporary practice in the United States must be more closely tied to their home jurisdiction. See
Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The Art of Making Change,
44 Ariz. L. Rev. 685, 714 (2002).
284. Report 201J, supra note 283.
285. Laurel Terry, Summary of State Action on ABA MJP Recommendations 8 & 9 (2011).
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3. Recommended Uniform Changes
The same changes in information technology and the same global
trends that are diminishing the importance of state borders in the
regulation of lawyers are affecting international borders. That has long
been clear in the European Union, where movement of lawyers among
nations, permanently and temporarily, is now permitted with minor
qualifications, despite the fact that the migrating lawyers come from
286
different countries with different legal traditions. American rules have
been generous to foreign lawyers. The FLC rule, which has been broadly
adopted, allows foreign lawyers to come here permanently and advise on
287
the law of any non-U.S. jurisdiction, thereby also benefiting foreign
nationals in the United States who need such advice and Americans who
do so as well.
Adding foreign lawyers to the in-house counsel rule would be a
sensible liberalization. An in-house counsel rule that permitted foreign
lawyers to work for their organizational employer at a U.S.-based office
differs from the FLC rule in two ways. First, an in-house counsel rule
allows the lawyer to advise only her employer and its organizational
affiliates, whereas the FLC rule allows the lawyer to advise anyone.
Neither permits court appearances unless the lawyer can gain pro hac
vice status. But the in-house counsel rule would allow the lawyer to
advise her employer on the law of any jurisdiction, including the United
States, whereas the FLC rule limits advice to non-U.S. law. This
expansion of authority makes great sense. Some foreign lawyers may be
expert in areas of U.S. law just as some U.S. lawyers are expert in some
aspect of foreign law.
Second, expansion of the in-house rule to include foreign lawyers
would change only geography. A foreign lawyer is free to give advice on
U.S. law to her employer in her home country. The United States cannot
prevent other nations from allowing their lawyers to advise on U.S. law
at home just as American lawyers, if competent, can advise on a foreign
nation’s law at home. A change in the rule would simply allow a foreign
in-house lawyer to advise her employer on the same U.S. law in the
United States. Nor is a stricter rule necessary to protect the company
from incompetence. Companies that are large enough to transfer (say) a
Spanish lawyer to an office in the United States should be sophisticated
enough to make intelligent decisions about the source of advice they
receive. Further, they are likely to have U.S. lawyers in the United States
available to advise on U.S. law when necessary. In the states that do
allow foreign in-house lawyer admission, no problems have been
reported.

286. See Davis, supra note 194, at 1357–58.
287. See supra notes 276–78 and accompanying text.
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The model pro hac vice rule should also be expanded to allow
judges, in their discretion, to admit foreign lawyers to co-counsel with a
local lawyer during litigation. The safeguards here are several and the
advantages clear. The trial judge would have discretion to grant or deny
a foreign lawyer’s pro hac vice admission application, just as she can do
288
now with domestic applications. The model rule requires that a local
lawyer participate in the matter and be responsible for the lawyer
289
admitted pro hac vice. The pro hac vice application must be made on
notice to the adverse party, which can object if it believes its interests are
290
compromised. The advantage of permitting pro hac vice admission of
foreign lawyers is that doing so respects the decision of the litigant to
choose the counsel who will represent her. In our adversary system, that
choice has a high value, although of course it must sometimes yield to
291
other interests. Representation by a foreign lawyer along with the local
lawyer is likely to occur most often when there is a foreign law dimension
to the litigation and the foreign lawyer can assist local co-counsel best by
full participation. Beyond foreign law, the foreign lawyer may be more
familiar with the client and the foreign context that forms part of the
dispute. In the states that do allow foreign lawyer pro hac vice admission,
there has been no report of a problem, although we do not know how
292
often the authority is invoked.
Aside from expansion of the in-house and pro hac vice rules, the third
area ripe for reform is the body of rules governing foreign law graduate
293
admission to the bar of a U.S. jurisdiction. As shown above, states vary
significantly in their willingness to let foreign-educated law graduates (who
may or may not be admitted to a bar) take their bar examinations, with
New York and California the most generous, although they are generous
in different ways. The question is complicated by the following issues:
 Applicants may come from civil- or common-law schools;
 In most of the world, law is an undergraduate program;
 Applicants will not have been required to study the professional
conduct rules governing American lawyers, as the ABA requires
294
for approval of domestic law schools;

288. The application requires the lawyer to reveal information about herself, including whether
she has been disciplined in any jurisdiction in which she is admitted. Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice
Admission (2002).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163–64 (1988) (disqualifying the defendant’s chosen
counsel to avoid a possible conflict of interest).
292. In a recent high-profile case, a Canadian lawyer joined in the defense of Conrad Black,
former CEO of Hollinger International. Bryan Burrough, The Convictions of Conrad Black, Vanity
Fair, Oct. 2011, at 252.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 236–275.
294. ABA Standards, supra note 42, at 20.
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 The quality of an applicant’s legal education will be difficult to
ascertain, especially if the foreign nation in which it occurred does
not have a credible (or any) process to approve law schools;
 Applicants likely will not have been exposed to the basic structure
of the American legal system;
 The civil-law applicant likely will not have been exposed to
common-law reasoning or to traditionally required courses like
torts, civil procedure, and contracts;
 The bar passage rates in states that do admit foreign law graduates
are low, in some states abysmally low, which may deter a decision
to invest time and money in reform; and
 Many foreign law graduates may not ever have visited, let alone
lived in, the United States. Some observers view absence of
experience with American culture, including legal culture, gained
by living in the United States and attending a U.S. law school, as a
295
critical deficiency.

The complexity of this issue encourages caution. Any decision to
open admission to foreign law school graduates, with or without graduate
law study in the United States, should be modest and should depend on
each graduate’s legal education and experience. Moving slowly means
that the distinctions we make may appear arbitrary. But it will be easier
to expand the authority later, if warranted, than to contract it. The
ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar has been
studying this issue and is considering a model court rule on the admission
296
of foreign-educated law graduates.
I add a word about reciprocity. Should liberalizing the rules on
foreign lawyer practice in the United States be conditioned on the
reciprocal treatment of American lawyers by the countries from which
the foreign lawyers come? Nations vary in their tolerance for foreign
lawyer presence, and even those that allow it may severely limit how they
297
practice. Whether any liberalization of the American rules should have
295. This view explains the New York Court of Appeals’ requirement that those foreign applicants
who must earn graduate law degrees from a U.S. law school in order to qualify to take the state
examination study physically in the United States. A degree earned abroad, from the same school with
the same requirements, is not acceptable. N.Y. Ct. App. R. 520.6(b)(3)(v).
296. See ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar, Report, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
council_reports_and_resolutions/20110420_model_rule_and_criteria_foreign_lawyers.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
297. India has one of the most exclusionary approaches but may be relenting. In February 2012,
the Chennai High Court held that foreign law firms could advise on foreign law in India on a
temporary basis and could represent clients in arbitrations based in India. India’s High Court Lets
Foreign Firms Visit, Law. Wkly., http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/indias-high-court-lets-foreignfirms-visit (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Canada has one of the most inviting approaches. Four of the
“largest and fastest-growing national economies”—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—have “some of
the most restrictive policies toward foreign lawyers.” Anna Stolley Persky, The New World: Despite
Globalization of the Economy, Lawyers Are Finding New Barriers to Practicing on Foreign Soil,
ABA J., Nov. 1, 2011, at 34.
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a reciprocity clause is beyond the focus of this Article. Reciprocity is
about trade barriers, their wisdom, and effect.
K. Increase the Likelihood of Competent Representation
How do we now assure quality? We do so ex ante with educational
298
requirements and a bar examination. Thereafter, we subject lawyers to
civil law liability for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. Civil law
claims compensate for actionable conduct causing harm. They operate
retroactively, not preventively. But their existence should also encourage
lawyers to take care in order to avoid liability in the first place. A
relatively new device to foster competence is continuing legal education.
But the CLE hurdle is often quite low and easily satisfied. Yet another
vehicle meant to signal special competence is certifications in a
299
specialty.
How might we better assure competent work? Several ways are
apparent, although a few will meet strong resistance. First, the CLE
requirement can be more demanding: no self-reporting by a lawyer who
has read an article or listened to a tape while driving. Attendance at least
two full days a year at a live CLE event can be mandated. Second, states
300
can raise their bar passage scores. To the extent that bar examinations
test skills, legal reasoning, judgment, and general knowledge, not the
minutiae of a state’s practice, higher passing scores should improve the
quality of the bar. Third, we can revisit the idea of specialization, and
heighten the requirements, so that lawyers skilled in an area of practice
can offer a credible additional credential. The heightened requirements
can include additional coursework, practice experience, and a further
examination.

Conclusion
Institutions and government will sometimes change rules to
facilitate or encourage behavior deemed beneficial. More often, perhaps,
they react to changes when and as appropriate. Reaction often will be
the wiser course, so as to prevent precipitous action. What is not wise is
intransigence when the gap between socially beneficial conduct and the
rules that constrict the conduct grows large. We have entered such a
period for the rules governing the legal marketplace, and it is in large
part a product of changing technology and the cross-border activity of

298. See supra text accompanying notes 33–55.
299. See, e.g., Fla. Bar R. 4-7.2(c)(6) (identifying several specialist certifications that a lawyer may
advertise).
300. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 560, 574 (1984) (finding that the Arizona Supreme Court
Committee on Examinations and Admissions’ act of setting a passing score for the state’s bar
examination was state action and not governed by antitrust law).
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lawyers and clients. Reasonable people will disagree on when and how
the profession and the courts should react to this gap. But doing nothing
is not an option. I hope my recommendations will advance the
conversation about how the profession should respond.

